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Shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap licenses have 
complicated contract law by introducing nontraditional methods 
of contracting to govern the use of software.  The retention of the 
underlying intellectual property by the licensor, and the malleable 
qualities of software, give rise to the ability and the need to set 
parameters of use.  The courts have tended to defer to the 
ownership rights of licensors by claiming that there is valid 
contract formation, even in “rolling contract” situations.  In this 
Article, I propose that a consumer’s assent to a transaction should 
not be transmuted into blanket assent to each individual term of a 
nonnegotiated contract.  Instead, the concept of “assent” should 
be bifurcated into two parts, actual assent and presumed assent.  
Actual assent means manifested, express agreement.  Presumed 
assent means that the licensee, by expressly agreeing to the 
transaction, may also be presumed to have assented to certain 
terms of the contract.  The licensee should not be presumed to 
have assented to all “not unreasonable” contract terms, however, 
as is currently the case under the “blanket assent” approach to 
contracts.  Whether the licensee’s assent to a given term may be 
presumed depends upon the operative effect of the term.  The 
licensee may be presumed to have assented to provisions 
governing the “scope of license” or the “terms of use” (as further 
defined) to the software or web site because such terms establish 
the conditions upon which the licensor has agreed to make the 
digital information available.  Furthermore, the caption heading 
of “scope of license” or “terms of use” should not be 
determinative.  The licensee should not be presumed to have 
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assented to provisions that (i) impose affirmative obligations or 
(ii) purport to take away the licensee’s legal rights.  The 
Introduction sets forth the doctrinal problems related to 
nonnegotiated software licenses.  Part I proposes a two-step 
analysis.  The first step is to determine whether the putative 
licensee has assented and the nature of that assent (i.e. whether the 
assent is to engage in the transaction or whether the assent is to a 
particular term).  The second step is to determine what terms 
govern the activity based upon the nature of the assent.  Part II 
summarizes and analyzes the current case law using my proposed 
approach, and applies the approach to a sample license 
agreement.  The Conclusion explains that a presumption of assent 
to scope of license terms and a requirement of actual assent to 
other material terms both respects the integrity of contract 
doctrine and accommodates business realities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
his Article seeks to expand the current discussion 
governing software licenses and argues that the sui generis 
nature of software often necessitates deviations from the 
classical contract model of bargaining.  A software license 
enables the licensee to use but not own the software.  The 
intangible and malleable qualities of software, and the retention 
of the underlying intellectual property rights by the licensor, give 
rise to the ability and the need to set parameters of use.1  This 
does not mean that when it comes to software licenses, the 
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1 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and 
Contract:  Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 484–
86 (1995) (describing the public goods problem as “particularly acute” in the case of 
software which is easily copied and distributable). 
T
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licensor’s exercise of ownership should be unchecked or that the 
licensee’s rights should be unduly restricted.  It does, however, 
mean that   contract and commercial law doctrines may conflict 
with and offend notions of fair play in business transactions.  
This Article proposes an analytical approach that respects the 
integrity of contract doctrine while taking into consideration the 
business realities involved in licensing software. 
Legal commentary of software licenses tends to be limited to 
discussion of nonnegotiated agreements, such as shrinkwraps, 
browsewraps, and clickwraps,2 and often lumps these three types 
of licenses together.3  In fact, software is licensed in a variety of 
ways.  In many cases, the licensee enters into the license 
“agreement” simply by opening the package containing the 
software.  In many other cases, however, the licensee has spent 
months negotiating the terms of the license agreement.  A 
software license encompasses both extremes as well as variations 
in between.  The focus of this Article, however, is solely on the 
problem of assent with respect to nonnegotiated shrinkwrap, 
browsewrap, and clickwrap licenses.4 
A shrinkwrap license refers to an agreement that is wrapped 
in plastic and included with a disc containing a software 
program.5  The licensee manifests assent to the terms of the 
shrinkwrap agreement either by tearing open the plastic wrap 
containing the software, or by installing the software.6  A 
clickwrap agreement is electronically transmitted and requires 
clicking on a button indicating assent prior to downloading 
software or accessing a web site.7  A browsewrap license 
purports to bind an individual accessing a web site but does not 
require the user to expressly manifest assent.8 
 
2 See generally id. 
3 While the interplay of contract and property concepts arises in all software 
licensing transactions, I limit myself in this Article to discussion of nonnegotiated 
licenses only. 
4 I reserve for another day the other relevant contract formation issues of 
offer/acceptance and consideration. 
5 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1239, 1241 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property]. 
6 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996). 
7 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Terms of Use]. 
8 Id.; see also Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements:  Validity of 
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003) 
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Cases, scholarship, and professional organization reports 
evaluating nonnegotiated software licenses have tended to focus 
on the issue of contract formation, and specifically, on the matter 
of assent.9  In many cases, the consumer or putative licensee 
does not actually read the software license terms but the courts 
have nonetheless found the requisite “assent” necessary for 
contract formation.  In so doing, the courts are deferring to the 
licensor’s business interests and the policy of facilitating business 
transactions rather than reaching an inevitable conclusion of 
assent mandated by contract law. 
In this Article, I argue that resorting to presumed assent is 
often necessary, and desirable, to address the unique business 
needs associated with licensing software.  Currently, courts 
purport to find assent where none exists in an attempt to enforce 
contracts that provide a net benefit to society.10  Yet, while a 
finding of constructive assent sometimes may be necessary to 
enforce socially desirable contracts, certain parameters should 
be set around such a legal fiction.  A failure to do so imposes in 
toto contract law principles that were established with consenting 
parties as a premise upon a transaction that occurred without 
 
[hereinafter Kunz, Browse-Wrap Agreements].  While browsewrap agreements 
often do not involve downloading software, they do purport to govern a licensee’s 
access and use of a licensor’s web site.  Because a web site owner has a proprietary 
interest in its web site, I do not distinguish between browsewraps used to download 
software and those used merely to govern use of a site. 
9 See infra Part II.A.  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Joint Working 
Group on Electronic Contracting Practices recently completed a two-part project 
on the validity of the assent process in electronic form agreements.  The first part of 
the project focused on clickwrap agreements.  See Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-
Through Agreements:  Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 
BUS. LAW. 401 (2001).  The second part of the project examined assent in the 
context of browsewrap agreements.  See Kunz, Browse-Wrap Agreements, supra 
note 8. 
10 As Richard Craswell states, in some cases, the costs of obtaining a party’s 
“proper” consent depends heavily on “just what is deemed necessary for [such 
party’s] consent to be proper.”  Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability 
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1993).  
Craswell further states that as a result, in some cases, such as fine print contracts, it 
may be appropriate to adopt a liability rule to avoid the unnecessary expense of 
ensuring consent is proper.  Id. at 10–11; see also Richard A. Epstein, Contract, Not 
Regulation:  UCITA and High-Tech Consumers Meet Their Consumer Protection 
Critics, in  CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION 
ECONOMY’ 205, 208–14 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (observing that different software 
products require different kinds of solutions which cannot be anticipated by the 
government and that current licensing practices have “unleashed an unprecedented 
wave of new firms and products” that have benefited consumers). 
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one party’s actual consent.11  The judicial transmutation of 
constructive assent into actual assent undermines one of the 
fundamental principles underlying contract law–that of 
individual autonomy.12  This Article further argues that, given 
the lack of actual agreement to terms, contract law’s deference 
to industry norms is troubling and misplaced.  In order to render 
a contract unenforceable on the grounds of unconscionability,13 
the terms of the contract are considered “in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of 
the particular trade or case.”14  Modern contract law and the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) state that contractual 
terms that reflect trade usage or industry standards should be 
 
11 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom 
of Contract, 43 COLUM L. REV. 629, 633 (1943) (stressing the need to “remain fully 
aware” that the use of the word “contract” does not “commit us to an 
indiscriminate extension of the ordinary contract rules to all contracts”).  The effect 
of assuming actual assent where there is none has led to some disheartening results.  
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064 RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 
563 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (upholding a warranty disclaimer as 
“conspicuous” even though it was contained within product packaging).  In reaching 
its conclusion, the Rinaldi court relied upon the reasoning of ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, which also upheld a rolling contract, although the disputed terms 
pertained to the license grant.  As Stephen Friedman points out, there is dicta in 
ProCD that cautions against applying that case’s rationale to disclaimers of the 
implied warranty of merchantability:  “That dicta indicates that even if ‘money now, 
terms later’ may be fine for certain types of contracts terms (such as the ProCD 
license term which limited the use of the purchase application program and data to 
non-commercial purposes), it may not be appropriate for warranty disclaimers.”  
Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance:  Warranty Disclaimers in a World of 
Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 677, 693 (2004). 
12 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 5–6 (1981).  Some scholars argue that, because 
consent to form contracts is not voluntary, they are not expressions of individual 
autonomy and should not be enforced.  See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1238 (1983); W. 
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 542 (1971).  But see Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1203 (2003) (criticizing as unrealistic objections to form contracts on autonomy 
grounds). 
13 For a discussion and analysis of unconscionability, see Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code–The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 
485 (1967).  Leff sets forth a framework for analyzing claims of unconscionability 
that entails both the manner in which the contract was entered into (i.e. whether 
there was “procedural” unconscionability) and whether the terms were fair (i.e., 
whether there was “substantive” unconscionability).  Id. at 486–88. 
14 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (2003); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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interpreted as part of the contract.15  Corbin suggests that the 
test should be whether the terms are “so extreme as to appear 
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of 
the time and place.”16  But where there is a pronounced 
unevenness in the bargaining power within the industry, a set of 
industry standards or “norms” may be established that reflects 
the interests of only one side.17  Using industry standards as a 
guideline where contracts of adhesion18 are involved merely 
reinforces the overreaching by the party with greater bargaining 
power.19  While the licensing of software is conceptually different 
from the sale of goods, many of the contractual problems arising 
from, and associated with, software licensing stem not so much 
from the sui generis nature of software itself but from the 
 
15 See U.C.C. 1-303(d) (2006) (“[U]sage of trade . . . is relevant in ascertaining the 
meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of 
the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1979) (“Unless otherwise agreed, 
a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage 
of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or 
supplements or qualifies their agreement.”). 
16 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128, at 551 (3d ed. 
1963). 
17 See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting:  Minimum Standards 
for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041 (2005) (stating that the U.S. 
standard of unconscionability is too high a bar to provide reasonable consumer 
protection and proposing minimum contract standards for nonnegotiated 
contracts). 
18 The introduction of the term “contracts of adhesion” into American 
jurisprudence is credited to Edwin Patterson when he described an insurance 
contract that an insured merely “adheres” to because he has little choice as to its 
terms.  Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. 
REV. 198, 222 (1919) [hereinafter Patterson, Life-Insurance Policy].  In a later work, 
Patterson attributes the term “contracts of adhesion” to a French jurist, Raymond 
Saleilles.  Saleilles stated: 
Eventually the law must . . . yield to the shading and differences that have 
emerged from social relations.  There are pretended contracts that have 
only the name . . . . For these . . . the rules of individual interpretation 
should undergo important modifications, if only that one might call them, 
for lack of a better term, contracts of adhesion, those in which a single will 
is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its law, 
no longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity . . . . 
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. 
L. REV. 833, 856 (1964) [hereinafter Patterson, Contracts]. 
19 But see Epstein, supra note 10, at 206 (stating that a “convergence in terms 
across competitors,” should not be treated as collusion but as “evidence only of the 
imitation that allows successful practices to succeed while others fail”). 
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concerted effort by licensors to create standard, one-sided terms.  
These efforts by software licensors to establish and shape 
licensing norms create industry standards that consumers soon 
learn to expect, even if consumers are personally opposed to 
those norms.  This type of private legislation by the software 
industry is similar to norms that have been established in other 
industries,20 most notably the insurance industry.21  It is thus 
imperative for courts to recognize the norm-setting impact of 
enforcing license terms under the guise of contract principles 
where the result is actually driven by business or economic 
needs. 
I propose that the doctrinal concept of “assent” should be 
bifurcated into two parts, actual assent and presumed assent.  
Actual assent would mean express manifested agreement, not 
simply to the transaction, but to each of the individual material 
terms.  Notice and an opportunity to read the agreement would 
not suffice; the licensee must manifest assent to a particular, 
disputed term, not just to the transaction and the idea of the 
contract.  Presumed assent would mean actual assent to the 
transaction and the contract generally but not to any individual 
or particular contractual term.  A contract could thus be formed 
with a finding of presumed assent, but presumed assent would 
not be interpreted as blanket consent to all the contractual 
terms.  Whether a given term would be deemed part of the 
contract, and enforceable, would depend upon its operative 
effect.  If the provision concerned the “scope of license” or the 
“terms of use” (as further defined) to the software or web site, 
then those terms would be enforceable (subject to traditional 
contract law defenses) although the licensee’s obligation to 
perform would be conditioned upon actual notice. 
A licensee’s right to use software exists only as a result of the 
grant of license by the licensor; the scope of license describes the 
parameters of that right.22  The licensor, by structuring the 
 
20 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 632 (stating that consumers’ ability to shop 
around for different contracts is constrained by monopoly enjoyed by the drafting 
party). 
21 See Patterson, Life-Insurance Policy, supra note 18. 
22 But cf. Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 481 (stating that courts should 
analyze the property claim underlying electronic agreements directly rather than 
obscuring the issues in contract theory.  Lemley states that to claim “that 
browsewraps are enforceable only where the drafter already had a right to prevent 
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agreement as one that is nonnegotiable, has made a decision to 
create a business model based upon those license terms.  The 
“scope of license” terms (and the license fee) are the material 
terms of the transaction, the terms that the licensor believes are 
significant enough to warrant “deal breaker” status.  The 
licensee has no rights to the intellectual property being licensed 
which preexist the license grant or exist independently of it. 
On the other hand, the licensor should not be able to lump 
terms having nothing to do with the use of the product or service 
under the “scope of license” or “terms of use” provision.  The 
substance of the provision, and not the caption or heading, is 
determinative.  The scope of license or terms of use include only 
those restrictions on the licensee’s ability to use the product or 
service.  Those restrictions, however, must directly relate to, and 
arise out of, the license grant.  If the operative effect of a term is 
to impose any obligation upon the licensee unrelated to how the 
technology is being used, or if the effect is to strip the licensee of 
any rights or remedies otherwise available to the licensee, then 
the court should require actual assent to such term. 
Often contained in nonnegotiated licenses are “free rider” 
provisions,23 included in an agreement because the drafter has no 
incentive not to include them.24  Furthermore, even if these 
provisions were deal breakers for the licensor, the licensee has 
 
a particular use is the functional equivalent of refusing to enforce those 
browsewraps”). 
23 Webster’s Dictionary defines a “free ride” as “something (as entertainment, 
acclaim, or a profit) obtained without the usual cost or effort.”  WEBSTER’S NINTH 
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 491 (1988).  I adopt the Webster’s Dictionary 
definition of the term to describe “free-rider” contractual provisions that are 
included in a form agreement and are not consciously bargained for by the licensee 
or the licensor.  I use the term with a wink to its meaning in the law and economics 
literature.  See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 
(1991); Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods:  A 
Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977) (describing 
the “Free Rider Problem” where “the achievement of Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources via decentralized methods in the presence of public goods is 
fundamentally incompatible with individual incentives”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (defining free riding as obtaining a benefit from 
someone else’s investment). 
24 See discussion infra Part II; see also Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:  
Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 837, 842–45 (2006) (discussing whether market pressure can discipline e-
businesses’ selection of standard forms). 
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preexisting rights that arise independently from the license grant 
that counterbalance the licensor’s intellectual property rights.  
There is no reason for either party’s rights to outweigh the other 
party’s.  The term should not be enforced simply because it is in 
the contract.  The nonenforcement of the term would result in a 
gap in the contract.  The courts should then refer to the U.C.C. 
or to other applicable law25 to fill in any such gaps.26 
I have divided this Article into two parts.  Part I proposes an 
analytical approach that reconciles the business realities 
involved in software transactions with contract law principles.  
The proposed approach requires first analyzing whether the 
putative licensee has assented and the nature of that assent (i.e., 
whether it is general assent to engage in a transaction or whether 
it manifests assent to the disputed term).  The second step 
requires determining what terms govern the activity based upon 
the nature of the assent.  Part II summarizes and analyzes the 
current case law using my proposed analytical approach.  I 
suggest that often courts have contorted contract law doctrine to 
enforce terms that were never actually agreed to, but which 
nonetheless were commercially reasonable, as explained in Part 
I. 
Admittedly, much of this Article and my proposal is generally 
applicable to form contracts that are contracts of adhesion.27  I 
choose to limit my discussion in this Article to software licenses 
because, while the problem created by licenses to consumers is 
 
25 As of the writing of this Article, a draft of the Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts is being circulated by the American Law Institute.  Presumably, 
a final adopted version would serve as an appropriate source for gap filler terms.  
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, Discussion Draft (Mar. 
30, 2007) (on file with author). 
26 In the absence of express legislative guidance or case law on a particular issue, 
the courts would resolve issues guided by the standard of reasonableness.  Ian 
Ayres and Robert Gertner refer to this type of default allocation based upon 
reasonableness as a “majoritarian default rule.”  See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989).  Craswell points out that majoritarian default rules are 
similar to liability rules, and that both are preferable where transaction costs to 
negotiate individual contracts are high.  See Craswell, supra note 10, at 14; see also 
id. at 32–34 (discussing the problems related to preexisting default rules). 
27 For a discussion of the issues raised by form contracts that are contracts of 
adhesion, see Rakoff, supra note 12.  I have previously discussed the disconcerting 
effects of applying interpretation rules to provisions in form contracts.  See Nancy S. 
Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules:  The Need for a 
Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 539–49 (2005). 
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similar to that created by other types of consumer form 
agreements, the application of the solution must be industry 
specific.28  In other words, the matter of to “what terms” we can 
presume assent would require consideration of the nature of the 
transaction and the business needs associated with that 
particular industry. 
The primary advantage of the approach outlined in this 
Article is that it defaults to the U.C.C.,29 other applicable law, 
and to ordinary (as opposed to industry specific) standards of 
reasonableness.  By contrast, the current law governing 
nonnegotiated licenses defaults to contract terms that are clearly 
biased in favor of the licensor.  Shifting the burden created by 
the nonnegotiated form of the contract accomplishes two 
important objectives.  First, it eliminates free-rider provisions, 
which are those terms that do not affect the licensor’s decision to 
enter into the transaction.30  Those provisions which are not free 
 
28 Electronic contracting may also raise its own unique set of issues.  See Michael 
H. Dessent, Browse-Wraps, Click-Wraps and Cyberlaw:  Our Shrinking (Wrap) 
World, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2002) (noting, among other problems, 
the difficulties of proving electronic signature fraud and the lack of ceremony 
associated with electronic contracting); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 477–85 
(2002) (discussing the various social and cognitive factors that may make consumers 
more inclined to treat electronic transactions casually).  But Hillman & Rachlinski 
conclude that while “e-commerce changes some of the dynamics of standard-form 
contracting in interesting and novel ways . . . these differences do not call for the 
development of a radically different legal regime.”  Id. at 432. 
29 Using the U.C.C. as a “gap filler” does not include preamended section 1-205 
or revised 1-303 (amended 2001) which incorporates trade usage where industry 
norms have been established through adhesion contracts.  See discussion, infra Part 
I.B.3. 
30 Mueller has noted that “so much contractual language” is retained because of 
the feeling that it “can do no harm and might do some good.”  Addison Mueller, 
Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 580 n.22 (1969).  This attitude is 
expressed by Michael Kinsley, the editor of the online magazine Slate.com.  When 
asked about the clickwrap agreement on the Slate.com web site, Kinsley admitted, 
“Yes, it’s absurd.”  But he then added that it was no more absurd than agreements 
at other web sites.  See James Gleick, Click OK to Agree, http://www.around.com/ 
agree.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).  Lemley and McGowan have referred to 
adoption of standardized terms by industry players as a “‘network effect’ of a sort–
those who draft contracts of adhesion with one-sided terms benefit if their 
competitors adopt the same one-sided terms.”  Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 
589 (1998); see also Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1206 (describing free-rider 
provisions as “socially inefficient”).  Korobkin argues that the reason form 
agreements require scrutiny is that buyers make decisions only in a “boundedly 
rational” manner, which provides incentives to sellers to draft nonsalient contract 
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riders, on the other hand, will require actual assent and will be 
called to the reader’s attention.  A requirement of an affirmative 
manifestation of consent requires the consumer to consider 
whether the proposed transaction in fact is what he or she had 
bargained for.  Forcing the consumer to click numerous times 
may be a hassle for the consumer, but if we are to take the 
notion of contractual assent seriously, it should be.31  To do 
otherwise would be to privilege transaction facilitation32 over the 
other objectives of contract law, namely enforcing the intent of 
the parties.  Second, the resultant consumer frustration may 
motivate the customer to select another, less contractually 
demanding, licensor, or it may encourage licensors to streamline 
 
terms to their own advantage, whether or not such terms are efficient.  Id.  The 
notion of bounded rationality was first espoused by Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize 
winning economist who suggested that because human beings are limited in their 
computational abilities, they make choices that are satisfactory rather than optimal.  
Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 99–100 
(1955) (noting that the concept of “economic man” is in need of “fairly drastic 
revision” and “the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a 
kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the 
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in 
the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist”).  Simon further stated: 
Because of the psychological limits of the organism . . . actual human 
rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified 
approximation to the kind of global rationality that is implied, for example, 
by game-theoretical models.  While the approximations that organisms 
employ may not be the best–even at the levels of computational 
complexity they are able to handle–it is probable that a great deal can be 
learned about possible mechanisms from an examination of the schemes of 
approximation that are actually employed by human and other organisms. 
Id. at 101. 
31 In this Article, I am primarily concerned with which party should bear the 
burden of a failure to obtain actual assent.  I do not address the issue of the type of 
liability that should attach where “proper” consent is lacking.  Richard Craswell 
argues that property rules are preferable under any autonomy-based theory that 
attaches importance to a right-holder’s actual rather than hypothetical consent.  See 
Craswell, supra note 10, at 8.  In many cases, however, Craswell states that a liability 
rule is preferable because the transaction costs of obtaining informed consent are 
too high.  Id. at 11.  Interestingly, in many software licensing cases, the failure to 
obtain proper consent would result in misuse by the nonconsenting party.  In any 
event, this Article is primarily concerned with the issue of what should constitute 
proper consent and who should bear the burden of the associated transaction costs 
in its obtainment.  To the extent that I do address the consequences of a failure to 
obtain proper consent, I do so in my discussion of gap fillers in Part IV. 
32 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass 
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 
(1996).  The authors argue that nonnegotiated licenses are an efficient tool for 
standard, mass market transactions.  Id. at 342–43. 
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agreements and provide less onerous terms to avoid losing 
customers.33  The consumer is forced to weigh the contractual 
provisions as part of his or her cost-benefit calculation in 
entering into the transaction.34  As it should be under contract 
law, under my approach, the contractual terms would more 
closely reflect what the parties have bargained for, thereby 
enhancing the economic efficiency of the exchange.35 
My proposal is admittedly contrary36 to the current 
assumption under contract law that all provisions in a contract 
reflect the bargain or that manifested assent is tantamount to 
blanket assent37 to terms that are not “unreasonable.”38  I argue 
 
33 Craswell states that if it is feasible for the drafting party to point out all the 
contractual clauses and explain them orally, her failure to do so should bar her from 
enforcing any clauses that were not so explained.  Craswell, supra note 10, at 59.  He 
acknowledges, however, that many contracts contain so many clauses that they 
could not all be orally explained prior to every sale.  Id.  Craswell thus recommends 
that in such cases, a liability rule should apply which would prevent the drafting 
party “from enforcing only those obligations that were both not pointed out and 
deemed unreasonable by the court.”  Id. (emphasis added).  My proposal strives to 
obtain an alternative result, the streamlining of agreements which would circumvent 
the need for imposition of liability rules but would, in most cases, achieve the same 
result by resorting to gap fillers.  See infra Part II.B. 
34 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 472, question whether “e-businesses 
will compete for customers with more advantageous contract terms” but note that 
the Internet “might be producing some diversity in the contract terms e-businesses 
offer,” and that “comparison shopping among standard terms actually might pay 
off.”  The authors speculate, however, that the diversity of terms “could be a 
product of the novelty of e-business and therefore might not persist as e-commerce 
develops.”  Id. 
35 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:  Law and 
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1990) (noting a 
“tendency toward inefficiency in transactions involving consumer form contracts”). 
36 Although my proposal is contrary to current contract law, it is not the first time 
an argument has been made in favor of actual assent.  See, e.g., Clarke B. Whittier, 
The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L. REV. 441, 443 (1929) 
(critiquing the “objective” theory of contracts of the First Restatement and 
proposing that using “actual assent” as the basis for “mutual assent” except where 
there has been a “careless misleading which induces a reasonable belief in assent” 
would lead to better results). 
37 Karl Llewellyn famously stated: 
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler plate clauses, we can recognize 
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.  What has in 
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the 
broad type of transaction, and but one thing more.  That one thing more is 
a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent 
terms . . . which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the 
dickered terms.  The fine print which has not been read has no business to 
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that a consumer’s assent to the transaction should not be 
transmuted into blanket assent to each individual term of a 
nonnegotiated contract.39  A requirement of actual assent 
reallocates the current balance of burdens away from the 
consumer to the party in a better position to accommodate 
them.40  As Friedrich Kessler wrote, “freedom of contract must 
mean different things for different types of contracts.  Its 
meaning must change with the social importance of the type of 
contract and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author 
of the standardized contract.”41  Vendors have been quick to 
take advantage of new modes of contracting to accommodate 
new types of products and services;42 it is time that they shared 
some of the costs associated with these forms of contracting as 
well. 
 
cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute 
the dominant and only real expression of the agreement. 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION–DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960); see also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 461 (defining Llewelyn’s 
notion of “blanket assent” as meaning that “although consumers do not read 
standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance are reasonable, 
consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be bound to them”). 
38 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 455 (noting that the current legal 
approach to standard form agreements supports Llewellyn’s view that the law 
should create “a presumption of assent (or ‘blanket assent’) to standard terms . . . .  
Llewellyn based his framework on the perspective that, so long as the terms are not 
unfair in presentation or substance, courts should presume consumers’ ‘blanket 
assent’ to the details they may have ignored.”). 
39 See Rakoff, supra note 12, at 1205–06 (criticizing Llewelyn for overlooking that 
boilerplate clauses often reflect the attorney’s “expertise” rather than the business 
person’s). 
40 See Jane M. Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps:  Exposing the Need for More 
Notice to Consumers of Computer Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. 
L.J. 197, 228 (1999) (arguing that materials terms of a transaction should be 
available prior to purchase of software product); Recent Decision, Limitations on 
Credit Card Holders’ Liability for Unauthorized Purchases, 13 STAN. L. REV. 150, 
154 (1960–61) (stating that it may be proper to determine a credit card issuer’s 
liability by “standards which would require it to bear a greater share of the risk of 
loss”). 
41 Kessler, supra note 11, at 642. 
42 See Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy:  Common Sense and the 
Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205, 1215–17 
(2000) (querying why “the risk of poor management decisions” resulting in 
defective products should fall on the consumer rather than the management of the 
company). 
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I 
THE PROBLEM OF ASSENT AND THE NONNEGOTIATED 
LICENSE 
Let’s say that you are downloading software from YOUCH,43 
a social networking web site.  Before you can start the download 
process, a clickwrap agreement appears.  In large lettering, a 
statement appears that you must click the “I agree” box in order 
to proceed.  You click the “I agree” box without reading the 
terms contained in the electronic agreement.  Are you bound by 
the terms of the clickwrap agreement?  Assume further that one 
of the terms of the clickwrap agreement requires you to permit 
YOUCH to release your personal information to advertisers.  
Another provision prohibits you from installing software that 
blocks pop-up ads.  Assume that a pop-up ad releases a virus 
that infects and deletes some of your files.  Let’s assume further 
that desktop icons appear as a result of your use of YOUCH’s 
software.  You try to delete those icons and remove YOUCH’s 
software, but are unable to do so.  You seek assistance from 
YOUCH’s customer support, but are told that, pursuant to the 
terms of their clickwrap agreement, YOUCH is not responsible 
for any viruses caused by use of its web site or its software.  To 
make matters worse, you have just been informed by snickering 
acquaintances that your profile is being distributed by YOUCH 
to advertise its “Lonely Singles Meet Your Match” marketing 
campaign.  Your grinning digital image along with a statement 
about your favorite songs, books, and foods are distributed far 
and wide by YOUCH’s marketers in the form of a jiggling pop-
up box–a use which you ignorantly agreed to when you clicked 
the “I agree” box. 
Far from being the product of this author’s overactive 
imagination, such contract terms are common on networking 
web sites,44 even if their enforceability has not yet been tested in 
 
43 YOUCH is a product of the author’s imagination. 
44 See, for example, the end user license agreement on www.kazaa.com, which 
states: 
Sharman reserves the right to run advertisements and promotions on 
Kazaa. 
. . . . 
. . . You agree that Sharman is not responsible or liable for any loss or 
damage of any sort incurred as the result of any such dealings or as the 
result of the presence of such advertisers on Kazaa and/ or kazaa.com. 
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a court of law.45  Generally, absent a finding of 
unconscionability, the terms of clickwrap licenses have been held 
to be enforceable.46  There are several problems with relying 
upon the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent enforcement 
 
. . . You agree, so long as you have not entirely deleted Kazaa from your 
computer, not to take any action, including downloading other software, to 
disable or block the display of advertising by the Software. 
Kazaa.com, End User License Agreement, §§ 7.1, 7.5, 7.6, http://www.kazaa.com/us/ 
eula.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 See also the terms of use at www.myspace.com, which state: 
MySpace takes no responsibility for third party advertisements or third 
party applications that are posted on or through the MySpace Services, nor 
does it take any responsibility for the goods or services provided by its 
advertisers.  MySpace is not responsible for the conduct, whether online or 
offline, of any User of the MySpace Services.  MySpace assumes no 
responsibility for any error, omission, interruption, deletion, defect, delay 
in operation or transmission, communications line failure, theft or 
destruction or unauthorized access to, or alteration of, any User or 
Member communication.  MySpace is not responsible for any problems or 
technical malfunction of any telephone network or lines, computer online 
systems, servers or providers, computer equipment, software, failure of any 
email or players due to technical problems or traffic congestion on the 
Internet or on any of the MySpace Services or combination thereof, 
including any injury or damage to Users or to any person’s computer 
related to or resulting from participation or downloading materials in 
connection with the MySpace Services.  Under no circumstances shall 
MySpace be responsible for any loss or damage, including personal injury 
or death, resulting from use of the MySpace Services, attendance at a 
MySpace event, from any User Content posted on or through the MySpace 
Services, or from the conduct of any Users of the MySpace Services, 
whether online or offline. 
MySpace.com, Terms of Use Agreement, § 12, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.myspace 
.com/Modules/Common/Pages/TermsConditions.aspx. 
 The terms of service on www.friendster.com state: 
By publishing, displaying or uploading (collectively, “Posting”) any text, 
links, photos, video, messages or other data or information (collectively, 
“Content”) on or to the Website (including on or to your profile), you 
automatically grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right 
to grant, to Friendster an irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, fully-paid 
and worldwide license to use, copy, perform, display, and distribute such 
Content and to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate into other 
works, such Content and to grant and authorize sublicenses of the 
foregoing. 
Friendster.com, Friendster Terms of Service, § 5(b), http://www.friendster.com/info/ 
tos.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
45 See Nancy S. Kim, Sacrificing Privacy to the Web Gods, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE–SFGATE, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/ 
a/2008/03/06/EDENVAIND.DTL. 
46 See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
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of nonnegotiated agreements.  First, courts have generally been 
reluctant to strike down agreements on the basis of 
unconscionability provided that there was notice and an 
opportunity to read the contract terms.47  In addition, the 
doctrine of unconscionability looks to industry norms to 
determine whether a term is enforceable, which may be 
problematic where the norms are set by an industry player with 
greater bargaining power.  For example, consumers may not like 
the fact that their credit card companies charge them hefty late 
finance charges, but they lack an alternative.  Credit card late 
finance charges are not unconscionable because all credit card 
companies charge them.48 
There is another problem49 with employing the doctrine of 
unconscionability in the nonnegotiated agreement context, and 
that is one that strikes at the integrity of contract doctrine.  How 
can a consumer be deemed to have assented to terms that he or 
she never read?50  Even if the consumer was given an 
 
47 See Blake Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism:  
Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 233, 261–
66 (2003); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 
ALA L. REV. 73, 91 (2006) (stating that courts have become more formulaic in their 
application of the doctrine, thereby undermining the doctrine’s “safety net” 
function); see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability:  An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1067 (2006) (conducting an empirical study of cases tending to show that claims of 
unconscionability are difficult, although not impossible, to win).  Elsewhere, I have 
discussed the limitations of the unconscionability doctrine, including a high 
standard of unfairness, review of events limited to events existing at the time of 
contract formation, doctrinal vagueness, and judicial discretion.  See Kim, supra 
note 27, at 550–53. 
48 In response to consumer credit-related concerns, state governments have 
enacted special legislation that regulates the substantive content of credit contracts, 
as well as expands the disclosure requirements imposed upon creditors.  See Jeffrey 
Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook:  An 
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 
841 (1977). 
49 Many scholars have also criticized the doctrine of unconscionability on the 
grounds that it undermines efficient business practices.  See Richard A. Epstein, 
Unconscionability:  A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 294–95 (1975); 
Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1387 (1977). 
50 But see Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 743 
(2002).  Professor Hillman has stated, “Although courts and commentators focus on 
the time of contract formation, this analysis actually yields little fruit. . . . [B]ut few 
parties think about this technical question, so the issue has little real-world 
relevance.”  Id. at 744.  Furthermore, Hillman notes that “even if the time of 
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opportunity to read the terms, if the consumer never actually 
read them, there could not be agreement to those terms.51  
Unconscionability is a defense to contract enforcement, meaning 
that a contract must have already been formed. 
Contract law’s present insistence upon blanket assent means 
that if we wish to enforce any of the terms, we have to enforce 
all of the terms, provided that an applicable defense does not 
apply.  In other words, if you had actually read the agreement, 
you might have agreed to the provision prohibiting you from 
using YOUCH’s web site to market to its members; yet you 
might have been unwilling to agree to the use of your image in 
YOUCH’s advertisements.  Yet if we want to enforce YOUCH’s 
right to prohibit your marketing activity on its web site, we must 
also say that YOUCH has a right to use your image in its 
advertising.  The only way for you to escape this situation would 
be if you could successfully use the unconscionability doctrine to 
defend against enforcement.  But your use of the doctrine of 
unconscionability would likely fail if, for example, the practice of 
using member profiles in banner ads for social networking sites 
was commonplace; you were simply unaware of it because it was 
the first time that you had joined a social networking web site. 
In this section, I set forth my proposed approach for analyzing 
nonnegotiated software licenses.52  Part A provides a brief 
 
contract formation is accessible, it does not tell us very much” because additional 
terms could be agreed to by the parties or barred by courts.  Id. at 744–45. 
51 For a general discussion of consent, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory 
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).  See also Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).  
Some contract theorists view manifested assent to the transaction as actual assent.  
For example, Randy Barnett has stated that clicking an “I agree” icon demonstrates 
assent whether or not the terms that are being agreed to have been read.  See 
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635–
36 (2002). 
52 Other commentators have suggested other approaches.  Clayton Gillette, for 
example, has suggested that the issue of assent should be disregarded in the rolling 
contract situation.  In its place, the presence (or absence) of representation by a 
third party should be used to serve roughly the same functions as assent.  See 
generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, in 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 241 
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).  Michael Meyerson has stated that no new doctrine needs 
to be created for consumer form contracts.  Expressly recognizing that consumers 
who sign form contracts typically do not read them, he has suggested instead that 
the courts should focus on how a “reasonable drafter” should understand the assent 
of a customer rather than assuming objective agreement to all terms simply because 
the contract has been signed.  See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of 
 814 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 797 
discussion of assent in contract law, and explains the concepts of 
actual assent and presumed assent.  Part B focuses on the scope 
of presumed assent, and introduces an analytical method that 
makes contract enforceability contingent upon the operative 
impact of a particular contractual term. 
A.  Actual Assent Versus Presumed Assent 
One of the basic requirements for contract formation is 
mutual assent.53  Mutual assent has not been interpreted to mean 
agreement to all the terms of a contract.  Provided that the 
parties demonstrate mutual assent to the transaction, 
disagreement about the meaning of a particular term will not 
nullify its existence.  The Restatement expressly distinguishes 
between terms that have been expressly agreed upon and those 
that are implied in law: 
(1) A term of a promise or agreement is that portion of the 
intention or assent manifested which relates to a particular 
matter. 
(2) A term of a contract is that portion of the legal relations 
resulting from the promise or set of promises which relates to a 
particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an 
intention to create those relations.
54
 
The existing contract interpretation rules then govern how to 
determine the meaning of contract terms.  For example, some 
courts will determine the meaning of a term in accordance with 
its ordinary usage or “plain meaning,”55 although many courts 
will examine such meaning in the light of circumstances existing 
at the time the contract was made.56  The relevant circumstances 
 
Contract Law:  The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1263, 1265–66 (1993). 
53 For example, under the Restatement, contract formation requires a bargain in 
which there is both a “manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange” and 
consideration.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979). 
54 Id. at § 5. 
55 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 833 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“The plain meaning of a policy provision governs, and an 
insured’s reasonable expectations are not considered except where the policy 
provisions are ambiguous.”). 
56 See Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 464–65 (Alaska 2004) (“Washington courts 
reject the ‘plain meaning’ rule of contractual interpretation and interpret the terms 
of a contract in light of conduct, subsequent acts of the parties, and circumstances 
surrounding contract formation,  as well as the literal meaning of the language 
itself.”); see also Pac. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 
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include course of dealing, course of performance, and trade 
usage.57  The courts will also look to the “reasonable 
expectations” of the parties in determining whether to enforce 
contractual terms.58 
1.  Is Software Really Different? 
Software licenses occupy a unique place in the law because 
they raise both contract law issues and issues of proprietorship.59  
While the form of the agreement may vary, all software licenses 
expressly retain ownership of intellectual property rights in the 
 
(Cal. 1968) (“A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written 
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be clear and 
unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or 
presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not 
attained.”). 
57 See generally Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th 
Cir. 1981); C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 
1995). 
58 Wessells v. Dep’t of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 1977) (“Contracts 
should be interpreted to comply with the reasonable expectations of the parties.”); 
see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); C & J 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Patterson, 
Contracts, supra note 18, at 858 (noting the tendency of courts to interpret form 
contracts to mean “what a reasonable buyer would expect it to mean” thus 
protecting “the weaker party’s expectation at the expense of the stronger”).  The 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine is most often used in insurance form contract 
cases, although its underlying rationale is equally applicable to consumer form 
contracts in general.  See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 459–60; Meyerson, 
supra note 52, at 1279–82; Patterson, Contracts, supra note 18, at 858.  See also 
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970), for a general analysis of insurance form contracts. 
59 The issue of whether web sites should be treated as “property” is the subject of 
much debate.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000); Shuhba Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 387 (2003); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 217; Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of 
the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and 
Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003) [hereinafter Lemley, Place and 
Cyberspace]; Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter Lemley, Romantic 
Authorship].  Lemley notes that the rise of the “property rights” view of intellectual 
property coincides with the widespread use of the term “intellectual property” 
instead of patent, copyright, and/or trademark law, and suggests that the “rhetoric 
of property” may make it tempting to treat intellectual property as an absolute right 
to exclude.  Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 23, at 1033–35, 1071.  Setting aside the 
issue of whether intellectual property is the same (or should be treated the same) as 
tangible property, I would like to focus on the proprietary interest the licensor has 
in the software as a product of the licensor’s business. 
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licensor while permitting the licensee to use a product that is 
keenly susceptible to copyright infringement, misapplication, 
and abuse.60  Many commentators dispute that software is–or 
should be–licensed, not sold, notwithstanding the purported 
license agreement.61  Although the issue of whether software is 
in fact licensed and not sold is an important one, for the 
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the 
licensor has an interest in how the software and/or web site 
information is being used because the use of such software 
and/or web site information affects the licensor’s business.62  In 
particular, the reproducibility of software has the potential for 
economic damage to the licensor in a way that many other goods 
do not.63  Many courts, understanding the practical aspects and 
limitations of selling software, contort existing contract doctrine 
to enforce agreements that in other contexts would be 
unenforceable for lack of assent.64  In so doing, however, the 
 
60 The Second Circuit in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 
(2d Cir. 2002), noted that it is this manipulable quality that differentiates software 
from other goods:  “Downloadable software . . . is scarcely a ‘tangible’ good, and, in 
part because software may be obtained, copied, or transferred effortlessly at the 
stroke of a computer key, licensing of such Internet products has assumed a vast 
importance in recent years.”  Id. at 29 n.13; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Issues in 
Licensing:  An Introduction, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 941, 942 (2005) (describing 
conditional transactions as licenses). 
61 See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and 
the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 581 
(1994) (stating that “the retention of ‘title’ in the ‘licensor’ is . . . a legal fiction” and 
that “[a]lthough the license purports to create a reversionary interest in the licensor 
at the termination of the license, few if any copies of licensed software are ever 
returned to their licensors”); Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the 
Shrinkwrap License, 23 COLO. LAW. 1321, 1322 (June 1994) (noting that because 
licensors typically do not retain title as a security interest, the license does not 
expire at a specified time, and the licensee does not make periodic payments, the 
shrinkwrap “license” is probably actually a sale).  Contra H. Ward Classen, 
Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 IDEA 1, 5–6 (1996) (“[T]he sale of 
software is typically not a ‘sale’ within the meaning of section 109 [of the Copyright 
Act of 1976], but rather a license accompanied by a license agreement . . . .”); 
Nimmer, supra note 60, at 941–42 (stating that licenses are a form of conditional 
transaction which is “by far” the most common type of transaction in information).  
The Seventh Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 
1996), expressly reserved the license versus sale discussion for “another day.” 
62 I address the issue of whether software is, or should be, licensed or sold in a 
forthcoming article.  See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 
BYU L. REV. (forthcoming, Oct. 2008) [hereafter Kim, Licensing Dilemma]. 
63 Of course, there are other products that are susceptible to unauthorized 
reproduction, most notably music CDs, cassettes, movie videos, and DVDs. 
64 See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d 17; ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447. 
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courts establish a precedent that applies to all types of 
nonnegotiated contracts, including those having nothing to do 
with software. 
My proposed approach starts with the basic question, does the 
license meet the technical requirements of contract formation?  
This seemingly simple and straightforward question has complex 
implications stemming from contract law’s failure to provide a 
middle ground between assent and no assent.  A finding of 
assent leads to a finding of contract formation; on the other 
hand, a finding of no assent means that no contract was 
formed.65  Not surprisingly, courts that wish to uphold a 
particular transaction or type of transaction have been more 
willing to find assent even in the absence of bargaining power.  
“Assent” has thus been construed to mean acquiescence rather 
than agreement.  While one of the objectives of contract law is 
universally acknowledged as being the promotion of individual 
autonomy, “assent” is thus stripped of any requirement of 
voluntariness or volition.66  While such a passive notion of assent 
seems inconsistent with the very reason why we enforce 
contracts, in fact, it reflects another of contract law’s goals, 
which is to encourage and facilitate economic transactions.67  
 
65 In the absence of a finding of mutual assent, the courts might yet find an 
implied-in-law, or quasi, contract.  Quasi contracts, based in equity, are legal 
fictions imposed in order to prevent unjust enrichment.  See Kammer Asphalt 
Paving Co. v. E. China Twp. Sch., 504 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Mich. 1993); Cascaden v. 
Magryta, 225 N.W. 511, 512 (Mich. 1929); Luithly v. Cavalier Corp., No. 98-5507, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10653, at *12–14 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 1999).  In a 
transaction involving presumed assent, the parties intend to enter into the 
transaction with an awareness that it shall be governed by contractual terms, but do 
not actually assent to those terms. 
66 See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?–An Essay in Perspective, 40 
YALE L.J. 704, 728 n.49 (1931) (“Agreement does not even today carry any . . . 
connotation of real willingness.  Acquiescence in the lesser evil is all that need be 
understood.”). 
67 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 630 (noting that “freedom of contract” is both 
practical and moral).  Kessler stated: 
 The individualism of our rules of contract law, of which freedom of 
contract is the most powerful symbol, is closely tied up with the ethics of 
free enterprise capitalism and the ideals of justice of a mobile society of 
small enterprisers, individual merchants and independent craftsmen. . . . 
 With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of 
competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has 
changed radically. 
Id. at 640.  For discussions about the socioeconomic benefits of contracts, see 
generally A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983); 
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Contracts, while important in clarifying the terms of 
transactions, also stall their progression.  Simplifying the 
contracting process–by discouraging or even preventing 
negotiations–thus shortens the time from transaction inception 
to completion.  The transaction is thus streamlined by allowing 
assent to be found even where the contracting party did not have 
actual knowledge of a particular term.  In actuality, if one did 
not know of a particular contractual term, one could not have 
assented to such term.  In contract law, however, provided that 
the contracting party demonstrated assent to entering into the 
transaction,68 the courts have not much concerned themselves 
with whether the party had actual knowledge, and thus actually 
assented to, the contractual term at issue.  Instead, the courts 
have focused on notice and an opportunity to read the relevant 
contractual terms. 
Notice and an opportunity to read contractual terms are only 
somewhat helpful in establishing the existence of assent.  While 
a rejection of those terms after notification does in fact establish 
nonconsent to the terms, the opposite is not true.  Where the 
consumer has no power to negotiate the terms, a failure to reject 
those terms does not establish agreement or consent to the 
terms.  This does not, however, mean that contractual terms 
 
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133–344 
(1954) (“[I]n a commercial and industrial society, a claim or want or demand of 
society that promises be kept and that undertakings be carried out in good faith, a 
social interest in the stability of promises as a social and economic institution, 
becomes of the first importance . . . .”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to 
the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986). 
 Societal changes necessitate a dynamic approach to contract law that takes into 
account all the primary underlying objectives of contract law.  See generally Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 
1745 (2000) (describing dynamic contract law as first effectuating the intent of the 
parties and then applying the rules that a legislator would use, taking into account 
relevant policy considerations); Kim, supra note 27.  While wealth redistribution is 
not considered one of the objectives of contract law, it is often considered to be one 
of the goals of the law more generally.  See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the 
Welfare State:  A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and 
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). 
 Another generally accepted contract law objective is the protection of reasonable 
expectations.  See Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 157, 
190–201 (1989); Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests of Substance–Promised 
Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1945). 
68 With shrinkwrap agreements, the courts have not even required an opportunity 
to read the contract terms prior to entering into the transaction.  See ProCD, 86 
F.3d at 1447. 
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should not be upheld where they are offered on a “take-it-or-
leave-it” basis.  In some cases, assent may be presumed because 
the term is one that the putative licensee would have agreed to if 
he or she had actually read it.  In other cases, assent may be 
presumed because the licensor would not have agreed to the 
transaction without it.  Thus, assent can be presumed either 
when the term is unobjectionable or when it is a deal-breaker 
term, so significant to the licensor’s business objectives that a 
refusal to accept the terms would have terminated the 
transaction.69  If the provision is one affecting the scope of the 
license, or the terms of use, it should be upheld.70  The licensee 
does not have an independent or preexisting right to use the 
intellectual property of the licensor.  The licensor, furthermore, 
is not required to provide a license to the licensee, and certainly 
not on whatever terms the licensee chooses.  A lack of actual 
assent should not, therefore, prevent contract formation because 
in many cases, assent can be presumed.  Assent, however, cannot 
be presumed in all cases, or with respect to all terms in a 
contract.  A putative licensee might be presumed to have 
assented to certain terms, but not to others.  In the next Section, 
I will discuss which terms should be enforced in the absence of 
actual assent. 
B.  The Operative Effect of Terms:  Why It Matters 
As explained above, if a party manifests actual assent to a 
contract, then that contractual term becomes part of the 
transaction.  This Section addresses what happens where a party 
manifests intent to enter into a transaction, but does not 
manifest assent to a particular term in the contract.  Where 
parties dispute the meaning of a particular term, or have omitted 
 
69 These terms are discussed in greater detail below, see infra Part I.B. 
70 The license grant provision should be upheld as far as the contract analysis 
goes.  There may, however, be other, noncontract law based, policy reasons for 
nonenforcement.  For example, a court may decide not to enforce a license grant 
provision if the provision is held to be anticompetitive.  Margaret Jane Radin has 
“urge[d] that policy arguments about [information] property . . . take explicit 
cognizance of other policy considerations . . . [namely] contractual ordering, 
competition, and freedom of expression.”  Margaret J. Radin, A Comment on 
Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 23 (2006); 
see also Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 55, 102–08 (2001) (discussing the impact and effect of price discrimination 
on copyrighted works, including the consumer use restriction in ProCD). 
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it altogether, courts will often determine meaning by reference 
to trade usage and industry norms.71  Where control in a given 
industry is concentrated, there is often a systemic lack of 
bargaining power.  Contract terms are imposed in a transaction 
by the party with greater bargaining power; these terms become 
duplicated and standardized within the industry.  These terms 
thus evolve into standard terms in form contracts, offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis, and representative of industry norms.  
This type of private legislation has occurred in many industries, 
including the insurance industry, the consumer credit industry, 
and in the subject of this Article, the software industry.72  Given 
the systemic lack of bargaining power in the consumer software 
industry,73 notice and/or an opportunity to read terms has little 
or no meaning–and does not mean that the consumer has acted 
either knowingly or willingly.  On the other hand, the party has 
manifested a desire to participate in the transaction.  Does that, 
however, mean that she or he should be bound to all of its 
terms? 
Assume a consumer logs onto a web site and clicks “I agree” 
without reading the multipage electronic contract.  Has the 
consumer agreed to those contract terms?  Common sense 
would tell us no.  One could not agree to something that one has 
never read.  Barring any unconscionable terms, however, the 
answer is likely yes under existing law even though our 
hypothetical consumer could not have actually agreed to those 
contract terms if she never read them, even if she had the 
 
71 For a critical view of the use of business norms, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant 
Law in a Merchant Court:  Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).  Bernstein states that while the drafters of 
the U.C.C. sought to incorporate business norms in an effort to make commercial 
law more responsive to business realities, “they failed to recognize that this 
approach would fundamentally alter the very reality they sought to reflect, and 
would do so in ways that would have undesirable effects on commercial 
relationships and would undermine the Code’s own stated goals of promoting 
flexibility in commercial transactions.”  Id. at 1769. 
72 See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 275, 316–19 (2003) (discussing how consumers acquiesce to licensing 
transactions because they effectively have no other way to purchase software given 
the evolution of the “licensing norm”). 
73 A systemic lack of bargaining power exists in other industries as well, but I 
focus my discussion in this Article on the software industry and the unique issues 
that arise with respect to licenses. 
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opportunity to do so.74  What the courts actually mean when they 
say the consumer has demonstrated assent is two things:  (1) the 
consumer expressed a willingness to engage in the transaction; 
and (2) the consumer can be presumed to have agreed to the 
contract terms.  There was no actual agreement to those terms 
where the consumer has not actually read them.  Contract law 
imputes agreement and does not require actual assent where 
there was an opportunity to read the contract.  The assumption 
is that the consumer would have agreed to the terms because 
they are reasonable and/or because the consumer had no choice 
but to agree to them.  This begs the question, to what terms can 
the consumer be presumed to have assented? 
In reality, the above-described behavior on the part of the 
consumer is not so much an expression of intent to contract as it 
is a ceding to the reality of his or her situation–the consumer 
clicks without reading because he or she knows that it does not 
matter what the contract says.  If the consumer wants to enter 
into the transaction, the consumer will accept all of its terms. 
Libertarians might ask, so what?75  The consumer is a free 
agent, at liberty to visit another site.  Nobody is forcing the 
consumer to purchase goods from this particular e-tailer, or use 
this web site or software.76  But in fact, in many cases, due to the 
systemic bargaining imbalance within a particular market 
segment, the terms may have become so uniform and 
standardized that the consumer effectively has no choice.77  It is 
not a viable option for the consumer to decline the terms of any 
 
74 Many scholars have written at length on the reasons why consumers do not 
read standard form contracts.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 305 (1986); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 445–54; Korobkin, 
supra note 12; Meyerson, supra note 52; Slawson, supra note 12. 
75 As Thomas Joo keenly observes, however, the use of “normal” human 
behavior as a standard “may promote libertarianism but it may also serve its 
nemesis, majoritarianism. . . . Enforcing a contract in accord with the expectations 
of most people rewards conformist expectations and punishes nonconformist 
expectations.”  Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law:  Fear of a 
Normative Planet?, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1037, 1047 (2000). 
76 For a criticism of the “economic libertarian” view, see Posner, supra note 67, at 
318.  Eric Posner notes that the historical survival of usury laws responds to a basic 
social problem and that “those who endorse the policy of poverty reduction through 
the welfare system should support restrictive contract laws.”  Id. 
77 See Mueller, supra note 30, at 580 (noting that consumers effectively have no 
choice in seeking variances to warranty disclaimers because “all competing goods” 
are “similarly limited”). 
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particular agreement since the terms are the same in the 
agreement offered by a competing web site.  So, the consumer 
clicks away and hopes for the best.78 
This situation is quite different from the model contract 
scenario that is assumed by contract doctrine.79  Not only does 
one party lack bargaining power with respect to a particular 
transaction, but one class of parties lacks bargaining power 
within a given market sector.80  The party’s “assent” in such a 
case is void of volition and merely reflects a failure on the part of 
the consumer to resist market forces through self-deprivation.  
Where the available “good” involves necessities such as credit or 
insurance, this deprivation has very real social and economic 
consequences.  Similarly, given the ubiquity of software and 
digital information, it is highly unlikely that even the most 
ardent supporter of contractual autonomy would forego an ill-
advised “click” on the basis of principle and an understanding of 
contract law alone.  Instead, those of us who are aware of the 
consequences of doing so click and cringe, and pray that 
whatever we have agreed to is either benign, unlikely to be 
enforced, or so horrible that it will be deemed unconscionable.  
A refusal to accept standardized contractual terms is simply 
unrealistic in many types of transactions.  Refusing to purchase 
software that is subject to the terms of a shrinkwrap agreement, 
or clicking “I disagree” to electronic contracts containing 
objectionable terms, is irrational and would force one to reject 
 
78 See Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133 (2002) 
(noting that consumers often click without reading); Hillman, supra note 50, at 743 
(noting the “widely accepted fact that, for a number of reasons, consumers typically 
do not read their standard forms”). 
79 Professor Arthur Leff discussed the difficulty with classifying consumer 
transaction contracts as “contracts” in a classic article.  Arthur Allen Leff, Contract 
as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).  Professor Leff proposed treating “the 
paper-with-words which accompanies the sale of a product” as “part of that 
product,” thereby inviting direct governmental regulation.  Id. at 155. 
80 Professor Addison Mueller noted two factors that together create the modern 
consumer’s lack of effective legal power: 
First, there is an all-pervasive difficulty:  our machinery of justice is simply 
not designed for easy use by the average citizen with a minor claim of any 
kind. . . . 
 . . . [Second,] he claims in contract and must use a deck of doctrine that 
is stacked against him. 
 Most of his losing cards are colored “freedom of contract.” 
Mueller, supra note 30, at 578–79. 
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many of the benefits of technological advancements.  The claim 
that such contracts are agreements reflective of free will is just 
plain fiction. 
On the other hand, allowing a consumer or putative licensee 
to take advantage of the transaction and then reject the offered 
terms also presents problems.  The licensor is not obligated to 
provide any products or services, and has a right to determine 
how much risk it will assume in order to engage in business.  The 
calculation of that risk is often reflected in the contractual terms, 
such as the licensor’s limited warranty and limitation of liability.  
The licensor may wish to offer the product, but only with some 
restrictions on the licensee’s use.  The licensor continues to own 
the intellectual property embodied in the software and likely 
wishes to restrict how the licensee will use it.  The readily 
manipulable nature of digital information and the ease with 
which the licensor’s business objectives can be subverted makes 
the licensor’s desire for specific license terms or terms of use 
understandable.  Courts, sympathetic to the licensor’s plight, 
have tended to enforce licenses under contract law,81 finding 
mutual assent provided there was a reasonable opportunity to 
review the terms.82  But, as discussed above, such an opportunity 
is hollow if it provides no option for the consumer to negotiate 
other than to decline to enter into the transaction altogether.  
This does not mean that the licensor should bear the burden of 
the consumer’s refusal to read contractual terms; nor should it 
mean, as it has in the past, that the consumer should bear the 
burden of ferreting out onerous terms in a multipage contract 
even if given the opportunity to do so.  What it does mean is that 
if the licensor wishes to impose certain onerous terms upon the 
licensee, the licensor must receive the licensee’s actual assent to 
those terms.  This shifts the burden onto the party in the best 
position to bear it–the party with greater resources and greater 
incentive to draft the contract. 
 
81 It is perhaps unsurprising that, as Mark Lemley notes, “virtually all the courts 
that have enforced browsewrap licenses have done so against a commercial entity, 
generally one that competes with the drafter of the license.”  Lemley, Terms of Use, 
supra note 7, at 462. 
82 In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Seventh Circuit did not even require review 
of terms prior to purchase but merely an opportunity to return the purchased item 
after review of the shrinkwrap license.  86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996); see 
also discussion infra Part II. 
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Some may wonder, what difference does the requirement of 
actual assent make if the consumer effectively has no choice 
given the prevalence of onerous terms in standard form 
contracts for similar products/services?83  The additional 
transactional impediments required to manifest actual assent 
slow down the contracting process, and that is an inconvenience 
that affects both parties.  The current accepted form of 
nonnegotiated contracts now burdens only the consumer, and 
offers no incentive to the licensor to offer streamlined 
agreements or reasonable terms.84  On the contrary, judicial 
deference to licensors’ legitimate business concerns85 has 
resulted in the licensors taking greedy advantage of consumers’ 
lack of power by imposing multipage terms that are accepted by 
a simple click. 
Robert Hillman has conducted an empirical study that 
suggests that requiring advance disclosure of web site terms will 
 
83 Korobkin, for example, states that notice of a provision does not necessarily 
render it salient:  “‘Notice’ is a prerequisite of salience, but notice is not a sufficient 
condition of salience.”  Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1234. 
84 See Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection:  The Problem 
of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006).  But cf. 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 472–75 (discussing how market forces may 
discipline drafters of standard forms but conceding that it is “unclear how long 
these factors will remain important”). 
85 Robert Oakley explains how license agreements evolved with technology: 
 Standard-form contracts became an issue in the consumer technology 
context when computers evolved from being essentially a business 
commodity . . . to being a consumer commodity . . . . In such an 
environment, it was no longer possible to have a negotiated contract 
between the seller and each and every customer.  There was also 
considerable uncertainty at the time about the scope of copyright 
protection for computer software. . . . In an innovative experiment, and 
with great uncertainty about their validity, these contracts began to take 
the form of shrinkwrap licenses . . . . Over the years as the technology has 
evolved, the licenses have evolved along with it to include so-called 
clickwrap licenses.  Browsewrap licenses were added as the Internet 
developed with its ability to create hyperlinks that would take a customer 
to a license agreement at another location. 
Oakley, supra note 17, at 1048–49; see also Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 
32, at 341–53 (arguing that mass-market end user license agreements provide 
substantial benefits for distributing information products, are efficient for mass 
market distribution, informative for end users, and enable software publishers 
commercial flexibility). 
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likely fail to increase consumers actually reading such terms.86  
He acknowledges that while requiring methods of attracting 
attention, “such as requiring bold text or clicking after each term 
on the screen (or both), might increase reading, . . . analogous 
strategies in the paper world have had mixed results, probably in 
part because consumers, worn down by the contracting process, 
are unlikely to be riveted to attention by such formalities.”87  Yet 
Internet transactions are different from real world transactions 
in significant ways.  First, the real world consumer has expended 
more effort in reaching a retail location.  The consumer has 
spent time and money on gas and parking.  Searching for 
alternative vendors also takes much more effort.  In the same 
way that price comparison shopping is much easier on the 
Internet than running from shop to shop at the local mall,88 so is 
it easier to move from web site to web site, not necessarily in 
order to review contract terms but to discover which web sites 
offer a more pleasant experience.  Web site marketers are very 
aware of the benefits of making transactions as seamless as 
possible.  In the same way that a consumer is more likely to 
return to a shopping site that processes transactions with “one 
click,” so too might that same consumer refuse to return to a site 
that requires numerous clicks to approve onerous legal terms.89 
My proposal contemplates a change, not just to the 
substantive terms of licenses, but to the mechanism by which 
assent may be demonstrated.  Because it affects the consumer 
experience, it is more likely to have an impact on consumer 
loyalty.  Standard form agreements thus become competitive 
factors in more than a purely rhetorical sense.90  To require 
 
86 Hillman, supra note 24, at 840 (“[E]-consumers may still have ample rational 
reasons for not reading and cognitive processes that deter reading and processing 
terms.”). 
87 Id. at 844. 
88 See Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Haggling 2.0, WALL ST. J., June 23–24, 2007, at P1 
(reporting that “search engines and fashion sites listing retailer discount codes make 
it easier than ever” for consumers to comparison shop and even bargain for better 
prices on the Internet). 
89 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass 
Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 695–96 (2004) (setting 
forth reasons why software publishers should care about better written end user 
agreements, including building goodwill with customers). 
90 To the claim that standard form contracts are unconscionable, it is often the 
response that consumers are free to shop elsewhere for better terms.  In reality, 
consumers are unlikely to compare several different multipage agreements for 
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multiple clicks burdens the consumers, but it also burdens the 
licensor.91  The transactional hurdles would likely result in real 
costs to the licensor in terms of aborted transactions and timed-
out web exchanges, thus providing an incentive to the licensor to 
rethink its contractual offerings.92 
While limiting presumed assent to license grant or scope of 
use provisions may be simple in theory, many licensors may 
simply attempt to cram more terms and conditions in paragraphs 
captioned “License Grant” or “Scope of Use.”  Implementing 
the proposed approach thus requires that the operative effect of 
the provision–rather than its caption–determines whether 
actual or presumed assent is required.  Generally, terms that 
restrict the licensee’s use of the intellectual property would 
require only presumed assent.  The terms of use would then be 
enforceable provided that traditional contract defenses did not 
apply.  In other words, lack of actual assent to license grant 
provisions or terms of use would not prevent contract formation 
even though traditional contract law defenses may still bar 
enforcement of those terms.  On the other hand, terms unrelated 
to use of the software or web site that (i) impose an affirmative 
obligation on the licensee or (ii) require the licensee to 
relinquish otherwise existent rights would require actual assent.  
These two categories of terms are discussed below. 
1.  Affirmative Obligation Provisions 
If the relevant contractual term imposes an affirmative 
obligation that is not directly related to the use of the licensor’s 
intellectual property, the licensor should be required to show 
that the licensee actually assented to that particular term.  Let us 
return to the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this 
Article where you wish to download software from YOUCH’s 
web site.  In order to start the download process, you must 
 
reasons exhaustively discussed elsewhere.  See Eisenberg, supra note 74; Hillman & 
Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 445–54; Korobkin, supra note 12; Meyerson, supra 
note 52; Slawson, supra note 12. 
91 Hillman, supra note 24, at 844. 
92 Korobkin claims that “negative reputational consequences of inefficient non-
salient form terms are unlikely to discipline sellers to offer efficient terms.”  
Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1240; see also id. at 1246–48.  While this may be true in 
certain real-world transactions, this is less likely to be true where the negative 
reputational consequence is combined with annoying transactional obstacles. 
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accept the terms of an electronic contract.  You have clicked on 
the “I accept” button but have not read the terms of the 
contract.  Your clicking expressed your assent to enter into the 
transaction, but not your actual assent to the individual 
contractual terms.  Is the provision prohibiting you from deleting 
those pesky desktop icons enforceable?  Under the blanket 
assent theory of consent, because you have manifested assent to 
the transaction, it is likely that the provision would be held 
enforceable unless it were unconscionable.  An 
unconscionability analysis would examine whether that term was 
unreasonably favorable to YOUCH, and whether you had a 
“meaningful choice” regarding whether or not to enter into the 
transaction.  Let us pretend that the software is being provided 
to users at no charge.  Using this test for unconscionability, there 
is a strong possibility that the provisions would be upheld.  You 
are not required to download the optional software and you are 
free to join other networking sites that do not have this 
requirement.  The term, while favorable to YOUCH, is not 
unreasonable especially if the software is being provided at no 
charge. 
The clause whereby you unwittingly consented to advertise 
YOUCH’s singles matching services, while surprising to you, is 
not particularly oppressive or shocking, particularly since you 
are free to go elsewhere and had an opportunity to review the 
terms of the agreement prior to acceptance.  In fact, many 
YOUCH members might be delighted by the prospect of greater 
distribution which increases their odds of finding a suitable 
match.  Yet the result is wrong.  One could argue that the 
provision in question is contrary to industry norms and defeats 
the “reasonable expectations” of the parties.93  Yet, what are the 
 
93 The Restatement, for example, states that “where the other party has reason to 
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).  An accompanying 
comment adds that “(a)lthough customers typically adhere to standardized 
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard 
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range 
of reasonable expectations.”  Id. cmt. f.  Generally, the reasonable expectations 
doctrine has been limited to contracts for insurance coverage.  See Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance:  Honoring the Reasonable 
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (noting that “a principle 
authorizing the courts to honor the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the insured is 
emerging.  This ‘expectations principle’ is used to justify a wide range of decisions 
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reasonable expectations of the parties with respect to a practice 
that is novel, i.e., the use of software in exchange for permission 
to use the customer in advertising?  The argument regarding 
reasonable expectations and industry norms carries some weight 
only as long as the practice is novel.  If other companies 
determine that this method is an effective marketing tool, then it 
could quickly become an industry norm, as one-sided as this 
norm may be.94  An establishment of an industry norm would 
then defeat any claims of subsequent consumers that the 
provision was an unfair surprise, or defeated their reasonable 
expectations. 
Under my proposed approach, your assent to the terms of the 
contract can be presumed with respect to those terms that 
restrict the way that you use YOUCH’s software and/or its web 
site.  Your assent would not be presumed, however, with respect 
to terms that impose an affirmative obligation not directly 
related to your use of YOUCH’s web site, nor would your assent 
be presumed with respect to any provisions that deprive you of a 
legal right (i.e., your right to privacy and your right to control 
the use of your personal information).  Terms that impose 
affirmative obligations would require express consent.  In our 
hypothetical, your assent to the license grant, but not to the 
other terms, would be presumed.  Your failure to read the 
provisions of the contract would not prevent contract formation, 
but it would affect whether a particular provision becomes a 
binding part of that contract.  This does not, however, mean that 
YOUCH would never be able to enforce a contract containing 
an agreement on the part of the licensee to participate in 
advertising campaigns.  In order for such a provision to be 
enforceable, YOUCH would need the licensee’s express 
consent.  YOUCH could obtain such consent, for example, by 
requiring the consumer to “initial” the marketing provision–
this could take the form of an electronic click immediately 
following the provision. 
 
granting policyholders coverage in spite of policy language that seems to deny it.”)  
Id. at 1151–52. 
94 Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1271 (noting that “if reasonable expectations are 
defined by prevailing custom . . . the doctrine could entrench and perpetuate 
inefficient low-quality terms that become commonplace because they are non-
salient to most buyers”). 
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It would be more complicated to obtain actual assent to a 
term in a shrinkwrap agreement that does not pertain to the 
scope of the license–and it should be.  The licensor should not 
be able to foist obligations not directly related to the scope of 
the license upon the licensee without the licensee’s actual 
consent.  Thus, provisions contained in shrinkwrap agreements 
that do not pertain to how the licensee may use the software 
(i.e., provisions that do not derive or flow from the grant of 
rights by the licensor) would be per se unenforceable unless the 
consumer was asked to initial such terms at the time of 
purchase–in the same way that consumers currently are asked 
to initial individual provisions of car rental agreements or other 
important, but not intuitive, provisions in other types of form 
agreements.  This requirement of actual assent would shift the 
burden that currently exists on the consumer to sift out the 
onerous provisions onto the party better situated to do so–the 
contract drafter.  The licensor as the drafting party is in a better 
position to point out the material terms and draw them to the 
licensee’s attention.  This may slow down the transaction, but the 
result would burden both parties whereas currently, the burden 
of nonnegotiated contracts is borne only by the consumer. 
Shifting the burden of affirmative obligation provisions from 
the consumer/putative licensee to the contract drafter 
accomplishes two important objectives.  First, it encourages 
economic efficiency in transactions by eliminating free-rider 
provisions.  Such provisions are included in nonnegotiated 
contracts even though their presence or absence would not affect 
either party’s decision to enter into the transaction.  Often their 
inclusion in contracts reflects a surfeit of caution, an obsessive 
desire for no-additional-cost complete legal coverage, or simply 
reflects boilerplate carried over from a prior form agreement.  
Those provisions that are not free riders, on the other hand, will 
be called to the reader’s attention and will remain in the 
contract.  Contract drafters faced with the requirement of calling 
out affirmative obligation provisions will either modify their 
contracts if the provision is considered important enough (i.e., if 
it is part of what is being bargained for), or they will drop the 
provision as unnecessary, thus streamlining and facilitating the 
contracting process.  Consumers, too, will gain from this 
requirement.  Currently, the overwhelming verbiage presented 
in form agreements makes it difficult to distinguish innocuous 
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provisions from those requiring more scrutiny and 
contemplation.95  A requirement of manifestation of consent to 
an affirmative obligation term attracts the consumer’s attention 
and requires the consumer to consider whether the proposed 
transaction in fact is what she or he had bargained for.  If the 
answer is yes, the consumer will proceed to click “I agree.”  If 
the answer is no, he or she will click “I do not agree.”  The 
consumer faced with such a decision may not be enthusiastic 
about the available options, but at least he or she is made aware 
of the consequences of engaging in the transaction.  The act of 
assenting forces the consumer to acknowledge the existence of a 
particular term.  The affirmative obligation provision then 
becomes part of what is bargained for, and is weighed in the 
consumer’s cost-benefit calculation.  The resulting agreement 
thus more accurately reflects what both parties wanted and 
encourages the efficiency of the transaction.  Currently the 
assumption under contract law is that all provisions in a contract 
reflect the bargain.  This assumption does not reflect the reality 
where nonnegotiated contracts are involved.  A consumer may 
want a particular good or service, but not the ancillary provisions 
that he or she may not have bothered to read.  This does not 
mean that the consumer should be permitted to set the terms of 
the bargain nor that a consumer should be allowed to pick and 
choose the provisions at his or her sole discretion.  What it does 
mean is that the contract drafter should not be able to get more 
than what he or she bargained for. 
Second, a requirement of actual assent to terms that impose 
an affirmative obligation upon the consumer provides an 
incentive to the contract drafter to streamline the contracting 
process.96  The licensor risks losing business or harming its 
 
95 Richard Epstein, on the other hand, argues that those who are less 
knowledgeable are able to “rely, often to free-ride, on the wisdom of their betters to 
achieve the terms that make for successful contracting.”  Epstein, supra note 10, at 
206.  But as Clayton Gillette points out, in many cases, there are divergent interests 
among buyers.  See Gillette, supra note 52, at 250–53; see also Meyerson, supra note 
52, at 1270–71 (expressing skepticism that there exists a “small cadre of type-A 
consumers” that ferrets out beneficial terms to the benefit of the nonreading 
majority of consumers). 
96 There is some evidence that streamlining contractual terms promotes 
consumer reading and understanding.  See Davis, supra note 48.  Davis conducted 
an empirical study examining the impact of simplified disclosure terms in consumer 
credit agreements.  He concludes that “[r]equired disclosure undoubtedly can play 
an important role in protecting consumers.  But to be useful, important information 
 2007] Clicking and Cringing 831 
reputation by putting forth onerous terms that will require the 
putative licensee’s acknowledgement and active consent.97  The 
Internet itself may facilitate consumer action.98  Consumers can 
easily send unhappy e-mails to licensors.  Individuals can share 
and disseminate information by posting comments in blogs and 
consumer-oriented web sites ridiculing onerous clickwrap 
terms.99  Such a requirement forces both parties to consider the 
importance of such terms in the context of the transaction as a 
whole; more importantly, it forces each party to acknowledge 
that the other party recognizes and accepts the importance of 
such term.  For the putative licensee, it indicates that the 
particular term is not just harmless boilerplate that will never be 
implemented or enforced by the licensor.  Minimal, and in the 
case of browsewraps, nonexistent, transactional obstacles 
encourage and facilitate consumer ignorance.  A requirement of 
actual assent makes it harder for a consumer to play ostrich.  
The repeated indignity of forced assent to unreasonable terms 
may, in turn, result in collective action by consumers.  Even if it 
does not, heightened awareness of a party to a contract is in and 
of itself socially beneficial.100  Furthermore, such a requirement 
 
must be available in documents free of needless clutter.”  Id. at 906.  He adds that 
consumer-credit contracts should contain “only those clauses essential to the buyer-
seller relationship.”  Id. 
97 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 470 (noting that the “intense focus 
on reputation created by the e-business environment diminishes the likelihood that 
e-businesses will offer inefficient terms in their standard forms”).  The authors 
caution that because of the availability of information on the Internet, “e-businesses 
must be careful about the content of their boilerplate, or at least might refrain from 
enforcing some of it.”  Id. 
98 Id. at 471 (observing that the availability of “Internet research will have a 
greater effect on e-businesses than on conventional businesses”). 
99 Some web sites have responded to such complaints by modifying their license 
terms.  For example, Fark.com recently revised its terms of use after users 
complained about the terms on BoingBoing, another web site.  See Cory Doctorow, 
Fark’s Copyright Policy Stinks–UPDATED, BOINGBOING, Apr. 26, 2007, 
http://www.boingboing.net/2007/04/26/farks_copyright_poli.html.  Thanks to Fred 
von Lohmann for posting about this issue to the cyberprof listserv.  MySpace 
changed its terms and conditions to expressly permit members to retain proprietary 
rights to their posted materials after member complaints.  See Billy Bragg, Op-Ed., 
The Royalty Scam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008.  CD Baby recently overhauled its 
clickwrap agreement, apparently in response to complaints from potential users 
about the overwhelming legalese.  E-mail from Derek Sivers, CD Baby, Hostbaby, 
to Seth Burns (Mar. 15, 2006, 07:46 PST) (on file with author). 
100 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 441–42 (stating that “[c]onsumers 
concerned about the possibility of exploitation can try to avoid terms they consider 
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reallocates the current balance of burdens away from the 
consumer to the party in the better position to accommodate it. 
2. Provisions That Take Away Legal Rights 
Contractual provisions that diminish the consumer’s legal 
rights should also be subject to the standard of actual assent.101  
Because such rights exist independently from the consumer’s 
right to use the software or other licensed product, the licensee 
cannot be presumed to have relinquished them.102  I use the term 
“rights” loosely here to include privileges otherwise available to 
the licensee that do not derive from or arise out of the license 
grant.103  Examples of provisions restricting or diminishing rights 
include those compelling arbitration in the event of a dispute 
and provisions limiting the choice of forum.  Currently, such 
provisions are standard in many nonnegotiated software 
licenses.104  There are a number of explanations offered for why 
and how these provisions originated.  Many commentators state 
that such provisions are essential to the drafting party.  For 
example, some scholars argue that the provision eliminating the 
licensee’s right of first sale under the Copyright Act is necessary 
 
exploitative and refuse to transact with businesses that have reputations for offering 
and enforcing manipulative contract terms.”  Additionally, “the aggregate decisions 
of many consumers can pressure businesses into providing an efficient set of 
contract terms in their standard forms.”) (emphasis added). 
101 See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1264 (stating that as a 
matter of policy “unbargained shrinkwrap license provisions that reduce or 
eliminate the rights granted to licensees by the federal intellectual property law” 
should not be enforced). 
102 Korobkin provides additional support for why such provisions should require 
actual assent: 
If buyers believe that personal safety or the right to seek redress of legal 
wrongs in a court of law are entitlements that should be inalienable and not 
subject to commodification, explicitly trading off these types of 
entitlements against a product’s price and physical features might create 
elevated stress levels. 
Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1231.  He notes that buyers often cope with the stress of 
emotion-laden choices by ignoring such terms and rendering them nonsalient.  Id. at 
1231–32. 
103 But see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913) (distinguishing “rights” 
from “privileges”). 
104 Judith Resnik has noted that increasingly alternative dispute resolution 
dominates (and supplants) the adjudicatory process.  See generally Judith Resnik, 
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 619–21 (2005). 
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to protect the licensor’s intellectual property rights.105  While 
many critics have questioned the validity of such arguments on 
substantive grounds,106 the focus of this Article is on the process 
by which such provisions are incorporated into agreements.107  A 
consumer may be unaware that he or she has abdicated certain 
rights or privileges by entering into the transaction.108  Even if 
such provisions are not contrary to public policy or otherwise 
 
105 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 32, at 352–61 (stating that 
software publishers restrict rights associated with first sale, such as decompilation, 
reverse engineering, and disassembly, because they risk exposing the secrets 
contained in the software’s source code); Mark I. Koffsky, Note, Patent Preemption 
of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering:  The Last Stand?, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1160–61 (1999) (claiming that contracts that restrict 
reverse engineering may become the “primary method” for software creators to 
deter such activity).  The recent enactment of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 
of 1998 (“DMCA”) is likely to alleviate such concerns.  Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  Section 1201 of 
the DMCA proscribes devices that are primarily designed to circumvent 
technological devices intended to protect against unauthorized copying.  17 U.S.C. § 
1201 (2006); see also Madison, supra note 72, at 287–90 (discussing how the 
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA operates as a form of licensing to 
restrict users’ rights); Peter Moore, Note, Steal This Disk:  Copy Protection, 
Consumers’ Rights, and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1437, 1440–42, 1445–48 (2003) (arguing that the first sale doctrine and archival use 
are in danger of becoming moot due to the DMCA). 
106 See, e.g., Hemnes, supra note 61, at 577–81 (discussing historical reasons why 
software is licensed).  Hemnes concludes that although “[o]riginally justified by the 
necessity of protecting software as a trade secret, software licensing now appears to 
be both unnecessary . . . and inconsistent with the general right of alienation that 
appears in the common law, the Copyright Act, patent law, the Bankruptcy Code 
and the Uniform Commercial Code.”  Id. at 599; see also Madison, supra note 72, at 
281–82, 289 (discussing how first sale rights are restricted by software licenses and 
the DMCA). 
107 See Kim, Licensing Dilemma, supra note 62 (discussing the legal and policy 
related problems with characterizing a software transaction as a “license” instead of 
a “sale”). 
108 As Friedrich Kessler noted: 
[F]reedom of contract does not commend itself for moral reasons only; it is 
also an eminently practical principle.  It is the inevitable counterpart of a 
free enterprise system. . . . 
 The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and 
mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable–the standardized 
mass contract. . . . The individuality of the parties which so frequently gave 
color to the old type contract has disappeared.  The stereotyped contract of 
today reflects the impersonality of the market. 
Kessler, supra note 11, at 630–31. 
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invalid,109 agreement to their terms should not be presumed but 
actively sought.110  Nonnegotiated standard form contracts, by 
their very nature, assume passive acceptance by the consumer.  
While there are numerous arguments in favor of such contracts, 
acceptance of their form should not mean wholesale acceptance 
of their terms.  A requirement of actual assent would merely 
shift the current presumption–a presumption that favors the 
party in control of the structure of the transaction.  Instead of 
presuming acceptance, as is currently the case, the presumption 
would be that such terms are not part of the transaction.  The 
burden would thus be on the contract drafter to prove 
acceptance of these particular terms by the consumer.  The 
terms could still be offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis; 
however, it would require a little more effort on the part of the 
contract drafter, and a lot more willful blindness on the part of 
the consumer, to do so. 
3.  Using U.C.C. Article 2 as Default Terms 
Much disagreement exists regarding whether software is a 
good or service and whether it is or should be licensed or sold.  
Consequently, it is unclear whether the U.C.C. governs software 
transactions.111  I advocate looking to the U.C.C. as a source of 
 
109 While many critics have questioned the legitimacy and validity of such claims 
on substantive grounds, the focus of this Article is on the validity of the process by 
which such provisions are incorporated into contracts. 
110 Resnik notes that “[a]spects of privately-based dispute resolution are now 
melded with public processes as the state itself embraces private dispute resolution 
for a wide array of conflicts brought to its courts and puts judges in the job of trying 
to resolve disputes through contracts.”  Resnik, supra note 104, at 622–23.  The 
enhanced likelihood that a judge will defer to contractual terms in determining 
procedural matters only highlights the necessity of ensuring that there was actual 
consent to those contractual terms.  Resnik proposes that “[i]n light of the legal 
ability to use settlement contracts as vehicles to generate court enforcement, courts 
should refuse to sanction certain kinds of bargains.”  Id. at 599.  Examples of such 
bargains include “most favored nations’ clauses,” and limitations of parties’ capacity 
to bargain for sealed records.  Id. at 650. 
111 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Nimmer, 
supra note 60; see also Kim, Licensing Dilemma, supra, note 62.  In most 
transactions with consumers, there is a sale of the medium (i.e. the CD) upon which 
the software or other digital information is loaded, but retention of intellectual 
property ownership by the licensor to the underlying program.  See Madison, supra 
note 72, at 297–99; Nimmer, supra note 60, at 942 (referring to licenses and leases as 
conditional transactions where the primary feature is that one “party retains the 
right in law to control the other party’s use of the information in various ways, while 
the other party receives only limited privileges or rights in the information”).  
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guiding principles with respect to consumer transactions, 
regardless of whether software is licensed or sold, or categorized 
as goods or services, or something else.112 
Any gaps in the contract created by the nonenforcement of 
terms requiring actual assent should be filled using the U.C.C. 
Article 2 governing the sale of goods with two notable 
exceptions.  My proposal precludes–indeed supplants–U.C.C. 
section 2-207.113  In addition, U.C.C. section 1-205 would not be 
applicable.  That section provides as follows: 
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing 
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or 
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with 
respect to the transaction in question.  The existence and scope 
of such a usage are to be proved as facts.  If it is established 
that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar 
writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court. 
(3) . . . [A]ny usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which 
(the parties) are engaged or of which they are or should be 
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify 
terms of an agreement.
114
 
 
Nimmer contends that software is not a “good” and therefore should not be 
governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. at all.  See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in 
the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 113 (2002) 
(stating that “[t]he software and digital information industries do not deal in goods 
any more than the motion picture industry deals in celluloid tapes.”)  Nimmer 
promotes UCITA as “a separate body of contract law applicable to transactions in 
computer information.”  Id. at 116.  The issue of whether software is a “good,” a 
“service,” or something else entirely, while an important one, is not to be resolved 
in this Article. 
112 See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 73 
(8th ed. 2006) (“[I]t should be borne in mind that even where a UCC provision is 
not directly applicable to a transaction–for example, where the provision is in 
Article 2 and the transaction involves services–the principle embodied in the 
provision may be applicable, so that the provision may serve as a source of law.”); 
see also Daniel E. Murray, Under The Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 448 (1971) (describing 
American courts as “almost zealous in extending the reach of Article 2 to non-sales 
areas”). 
113 As Epstein points out, section 2-207 is “an unfit model to carry over to the 
licenses of software and computer information technology, whether or not these are 
covered under the sale of goods provisions of the UCC.”  See Epstein, supra note 
10, at 216. 
114 U.C.C. § 1-205 (2000).  The corresponding section in the 2007 version of the 
U.C.C. states that “usage of trade . . . is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the 
parties’ agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement, 
and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”  U.C.C. § 1-303(d) 
(2007). 
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In an industry governed by contracts of adhesion, the creation 
of industry “standards” does not reflect mutually agreed terms.  
This does not mean that such terms would never be included as 
part of a contract; it does, however, mean that in order to so 
include them, actual–and not presumed–assent would be 
required. 
II 
MAKING SENSE OF NONNEGOTIATED SOFTWARE LICENSES 
This Section applies my proposed approach in two different 
ways.  Part A analyzes the current case law addressing issues 
raised by nonnegotiated licenses and discusses how the disparate 
court opinions may be reconciled under the approach set forth in 
Part I.  Part B examines a sample software license agreement 
and reviews how typical contract provisions might fare using the 
proposed approach. 
A.  An Overview of the Law Governing Nonnegotiated Licenses 
Software licenses are usually categorized as negotiated or 
nonnegotiated.  Nonnegotiated agreements typically include 
shrinkwrap, browsewrap, and clickwrap licenses.  The form of 
these licenses evolved to accommodate the form of the product 
that was being licensed and the perceived need for protection.  
As technology enabled different venues or applications, the form 
of the licenses adapted to these changes.115  This section 
examines the current law pertaining to each of these types of 
licenses.116 
1.  Shrinkwrap Licenses 
Does a customer enter into a contract when he or she unwraps 
a software package?  The first courts to address the issue of 
shrinkwrap agreements117 concluded in the negative.  In Step-
 
115 See Oakley, supra note 17, at 1048–54. 
116 This section offers only a cursory overview of the law governing shrinkwraps, 
clickwraps, and browsewraps because this territory has been well trod by other 
scholars.  See, e.g., Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under E-
Sign:  “There’s a New Sheriff in Town!”, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 943, 949–91 (2002); 
Joo, supra note 75; Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5. 
117 A shrinkwrap license is an example of a “rolling contract.”  In a rolling 
contract situation, the customer orders and pays for the goods before having an 
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Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the Third Circuit 
held that a “box-top” license was invalid under the U.C.C.118  
The Court determined that the contract for the sale of the 
software product was made when the product was purchased; 
therefore, any terms contained in the shrinkwrap were merely 
unaccepted “proposals for modification” under U.C.C. Section 
2-207 and not a conditional acceptance by the software 
producer.119  In other words, the consumer never assented to the 
terms of the shrinkwrap agreement.  The Fifth Circuit in Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd. stated that a shrinkwrap license 
was unenforceable because it touched upon federal copyright 
law and was therefore preempted.120 
In 1996, however, the Seventh Circuit, in the landmark case of 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, concluded that “[s]hrinkwrap licenses 
are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds 
applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a 
rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”121  The 
plaintiff, ProCD, compiled information from over 3000 
telephone directories into a computer database.122  It sold a 
version of the database, called SelectPhone, on compact discs.123  
The plaintiff claimed that the database cost more than ten 
million dollars to compile and additional resources to 
maintain.124  ProCD sold its database to the general public for 
personal use at a significantly lower price than it did to 
manufacturers and retailers.125  The court discussed ProCD’s 
price discrimination policy and the financial benefits to 
consumers.126  It stated that rather than tailoring the product to 
 
opportunity to review the contract terms, which are included with the product.  See 
Hillman, supra note 50, at 744. 
118 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
119 Id. at 98, 102–03. 
120 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). 
121 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
122 The court assumed that the database could not be copyrighted.  Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 The court stated: 
 If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a 
single price–that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than 
to the general public–it would have to raise the price substantially over 
$150 [the retail price for the general public].  The ensuing reduction in sales 
 838 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 797 
suit a particular user,127 ProCD decided to contractually bind its 
customers to its price discrimination policy.128  The outside of 
each box stated that the software was subject to enclosed license 
terms.  The license, which limited use of the program to 
noncommercial purposes, was contained in the user’s manual.129 
The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased a consumer 
package of SelectPhone and formed a company to resell the 
information contained in the database on the Internet for a price 
that was less than what ProCD charged its commercial 
customers.130  Zeidenberg argued that ProCD made an offer by 
placing the software in stores.131  He stated, and the district court 
agreed, that he “accepted” the offer by purchasing the 
software.132  The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that “ProCD 
proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the 
software after having an opportunity to read the license at 
 
would harm consumers who value the information at, say, $200.  They get 
consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement but would cease to 
buy if the price rose substantially.  If because of high elasticity of demand 
in the consumer segment of the market the only way to make a profit 
turned out to be a price attractive to commercial users alone, then all 
consumers would lose out–and so would the commercial clients, who 
would have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain 
any contribution toward costs from the consumer market. 
Id. 
127 The court hinted that modifying the product might be more cumbersome than 
contractual enforcement: 
 To make price discrimination work . . . the seller must be able to control 
arbitrage. . . . Vendors of computer software have a harder task [than 
airline carriers or movie producers].  Anyone can walk into a retail store 
and buy a box. . . . . [E]ven a commercial-user-detector at the door would 
not work, because a consumer could buy the software and resell to a 
commercial user.  That arbitrage would break down the price 
discrimination and drive up the minimum price at which ProCD would sell 
to anyone. 
 Instead of tinkering with the product and letting users sort themselves–
for example, furnishing current data at a high price that would be attractive 
only to commercial customers, and two-year-old data at a low price–
ProCD turned to the institution of contract. 
Id. at 1450. 
128 Id. 
129 It also appeared on the user’s screen every time the software was run.  Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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leisure.”133  It further noted that while contracts are often formed 
simply by paying for a product and walking out of the store, the 
U.C.C. permits contracts to be formed in other ways.134  Since 
ProCD, courts have generally upheld the enforceability of 
shrinkwrap licenses.135 
As many scholars have noted, the ProCD court’s analysis of 
the U.C.C. leaves much to be desired.136  U.C.C. section 2-204(1) 
states, “A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, including . . . conduct by 
both parties which recognizes the existence of [such] . . . a 
contract.”137  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, turned 
this provision on its head so that the parties’ conduct no longer 
established the existence of the agreement.  According to 
Easterbrook, the written contract assigned meaning to the 
conduct rather than the other way around.  Under this analysis, 
the placement of software on a store shelf would not constitute 
an offer to sell that a consumer could accept by payment and 
dominion over the software copy (as the defendant had argued) 
nor, alternatively, would the consumer’s payment for the 
software constitute an offer that the store would accept by taking 
payment (as typically understood under traditional contract 
 
133 Id. at 1452. 
134 Id. 
135 See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe 
Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Peerless 
Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Pa. 
2000).  While a minority of courts has refused to enforce shrinkwrap licenses even 
after ProCD, these cases lack a consistent rationale and are distinguishable on their 
facts.  For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas held in a recent opinion that a 
shrinkwrap agreement submitted after the buyer had accepted the seller’s proposal 
was a request for modification.  See Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 
144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006).  The Wachter court distinguished ProCD and Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1987), because those cases involved 
nonnegotiated consumer contracts.  See also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 
2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding the U.C.C. applicable to the sale of computers). 
136 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 468–69 (noting that the ProCD 
court’s legal reasoning is “certainly questionable”); see also Post, supra note 42, at 
1226 (stating that Judge Easterbrook ignored U.C.C. sections 2-207 and 2-206, the 
commentary to these sections, the existing precedent interpreting the statute, and 
the commentary of scholars and experts on Article 2). 
137 U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003). 
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law).138  Instead, under Easterbrook’s view, the meaning assigned 
to the buyer’s conduct would be determined by the agreement 
contained within the software box.  Thus, if the terms within the 
box stated that the buyer agrees to pay a fifty dollar monthly 
maintenance fee, then the buyer’s purchase and dominion of the 
software would indicate assent to that term even though the 
buyer did not know about the term until after completing the 
conduct which purports to establish such assent.  Perhaps most 
notably, the ProCD court held that Zeidenberg demonstrated 
assent to the shrinkwrap license terms by retaining and using the 
software even though a consumer could be expected to undertake 
these actions for reasons other than to demonstrate assent.139  But 
as Corbin stated: 
[A]n offeror can not, merely by saying that the offeree’s 
silence will be taken as an acceptance, cause it to be operative 
as such. . . . It is substantially the same case as where an offeror 
attempts to give the meaning of an acceptance to some other 
ordinary act of the offeree that the latter wishes to do without 
giving it such a meaning.  If A offers his land to B for a price, 
saying that B may signify his acceptance by eating his breakfast 
or by hanging out his flag on Washington’s birthday or by 
attending church on Sunday, he does not thereby make such 
action by B operative as an acceptance against B’s will.
140
 
Under the court’s analysis in ProCD, assent to the terms of a 
shrinkwrap license is presumed and the burden is placed upon 
the consumer to disaffirm assent.  In other words, Easterbrook’s 
analysis places an affirmative obligation upon the consumer to 
establish nonconsent to the terms of the shrinkwrap 
agreement–something which is anathema to contract law, which 
has long maintained that silence, or inaction, should not 
constitute acceptance.141  Zeidenberg’s failure to object to the 
terms of the shrinkwrap agreement–which can only be 
 
138 See Post, supra note 42, at 1226 (stating that “as most first year law students 
can tell you, a display of merchandise in a store window, and one supposes on a 
shelf, is nothing more than an ‘invitation to offer.’”). 
139 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453; Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 468 
(noting that “the specified conduct that indicates acceptance is the opening of a 
package and the loading of software the consumer has already paid for–precisely 
the conduct one would expect the user to engage in if she had been unaware of the 
shrinkwrap license.”). 
140 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 73, at 310. 
141 Id. §§ 71–72, at 298–309; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
69 (1979). 
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expressed by taking affirmative steps to return the software–is 
thus construed as assent, even where such failure can be 
attributable to other causes, such as ignorance or logistical 
constraints.142 
An alternative, and better, contract law analysis of the 
transaction in ProCD would be that the terms of the shrinkwrap 
agreement do not govern the sales transaction, which is complete 
at the time the consumer makes payment and such payment is 
accepted by the store.  The consumer does not and logically 
cannot assent to these terms prior to the completion of the sales 
transaction.  The terms fail as modifications to the sales 
transaction because they are not supported by consideration nor 
is the consumer compelled to accept any such attempted 
modifications.  This does not mean that the terms of the 
shrinkwrap agreement are without any role or effect.  The terms 
of the scope of license or terms of use provide the consumer with 
notice of the software producer’s business policies and the 
conditions upon which the software is being provided.  The 
absence of the consumer’s express consent does not mean that 
those terms do not nonetheless govern the relationship.  The 
consumer’s act of accepting the offer to sell the software (or, 
more accurately, the consumer’s offer to purchase the software 
which is then accepted by acceptance of payment) does not then 
give the consumer the right to establish the scope of the license 
grant.143  While the consumer’s purchase of the software does not 
thereby demonstrate actual assent to all the shrinkwrap terms, 
assent to the scope of license terms can be presumed because the 
licensor has the power to establish the terms upon which the 
software shall be provided.  The licensor’s intellectual property 
ownership of the software code entitles it to establish the 
parameters of the license grant that it wishes to provide to 
licensees provided that it does not trammel on the licensee’s 
unrelinquished preexisting rights or impose affirmative 
responsibilities unrelated to how the software is used.  In other 
words, while the licensor does not have the right to force the 
licensee to undertake affirmative acts or to relinquish legal 
 
142 See Rolling, supra note 40, at 226 (noting that consumers are subject to retail 
store policies, and that those who live in rural areas may find it costly and time 
consuming to drive to retail outlets or to return ship mail-ordered products). 
143 For a discussion of the role of normative assumptions in contract law, see 
generally Joo, supra note 75. 
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rights, the licensee should not have the right to provide the terms 
by which the licensor chooses to conduct its business.144 
2.  Clickwrap Licenses 
ProCD addressed the enforceability of a shrinkwrap license 
that accompanies the purchase of software contained in a box.  
In many cases, however, software is distributed over the Internet 
pursuant to the terms of a clickwrap agreement.  In some ways, 
clickwrap agreements are less problematic than shrinkwrap 
agreements for the simple reason that a user expressly manifests 
assent by clicking.145  Generally, clickwrap agreements do not 
permit a user to progress until and unless the user clicks on a box 
containing the words “I agree” or some similar expression of 
agreement.  Often, the user is asked to acknowledge the terms of 
a clickwrap agreement by clicking more than once.  But not all 
clickwrap agreements are alike.  While some agreements display 
all their provisions on a single computer page, many clickwrap 
agreements appear in small textboxes that require constant 
scrolling in order to review their terms.  Sometimes, the “assent” 
button does not appear within the text box but is readily 
apparent alongside it on the screen.  This cumbersome and 
aggravating method of providing clickwrap terms, while 
facilitating the user’s ability to express assent, seems specifically 
designed to encourage users to simply click on the “I agree” 
button without reading the terms.146 
Clickwrap agreements do not raise the same contract 
formation concerns as shrinkwrap agreements because the user 
 
144 See Nimmer, supra note 60, at 950 (critiquing opponents of standard form 
contracts who take a “result-oriented” position that favors buyers and holds that 
“the transferee should be entitled to receive a transfer including specific terms, 
regardless of the terms sought by the other party”). 
145 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use 
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 548 (2003). 
146 See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Software License Agreement, http://sunsolve.sun 
.com/show.do?target=patches/patch-license&nav=pub-patches (last visited Mar. 18, 
2008).  Several courts have made this observation as well.  See, e.g., Scarcella v. 
AOL, No. 1168/04, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1578, at *2–3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 
2004) (noting that the presentation of the agreement made it easy to skip reading 
the terms:  “Defendant considerately makes it very easy to avoid going to the 
trouble of slogging through all of that text.  The customer can bypass all that bother 
by simply pressing the ‘OK, I Agree’ button.  If the customer nonetheless bites the 
bullet and presses the ‘Read Now’ button, Defendant affords him or her a second 
opportunity to skip over what will become the contract between the parties . . . .”). 
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typically has notice of the terms and has an opportunity to read 
them prior to engaging in the contractual relationship.  A user is 
also not required to take onerous affirmative steps to disaffirm 
the contract by, for example, returning the merchandise; a 
simple click on “I DO NOT ACCEPT” will do.147  Courts have 
refused to uphold clickwrap agreements if users do not have 
sufficient notice of their terms, or do not have to affirmatively 
accept the terms of use.148  This does not mean that clickwrap 
agreements do not raise any contractual issues at all.  In 
particular, many commentators find their “take-it-or-leave-it” 
nature troubling.  They are not, however, inherently more 
troubling than other contracts of adhesion simply because their 
terms are digital rather than inscribed on paper.149 
One of the first cases to address the issue of clickwrap 
agreements, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, involved a forum 
selection clause.150  The defendant, Patterson, was a resident of 
Houston, Texas, who claimed never to have visited Ohio.151  The 
plaintiff was CompuServe, a computer information service 
headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.152  Patterson subscribed to 
CompuServe’s computing and information services via the 
Internet and placed certain computer software products as 
“shareware” on the CompuServe system for others to use and 
purchase.153  When Patterson became a shareware provider, he 
entered into a “Shareware Registration Agreement” (“SRA”) 
with CompuServe.154  Pursuant to the SRA, CompuServe 
provided its subscribers access to the shareware that Patterson 
created as an independent contractor.155  The SRA incorporated 
 
147 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Caspi v. 
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
148 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing 
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a license agreement that was not 
readily apparent to user downloading software); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. 
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing to enforce an online license agreement 
because the link to it was not sufficiently obvious). 
149 For a comprehensive analysis and comparison of paper-based and electronic-
based standard form contracts, see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28. 
150 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
151 Id. at 1260. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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by reference two other documents, the CompuServe Service 
Agreement (“Service Agreement”) and the Rules of 
Operation.156  Both the SRA and the Service Agreement stated 
that they were entered into in Ohio.157  The Service Agreement 
further provided that its terms were “‘governed by and 
construed in accordance with’ Ohio law.”158  The court noted 
that the SRA required Patterson to type “AGREE” at various 
points in the document “[i]n recognition of [his] on line [sic] 
agreement to all the above terms and conditions.”159  Patterson 
marketed his software for several years on CompuServe’s 
system.160  CompuServe later began to market a similar software 
product, which gave rise to Patterson’s allegations of trademark 
infringement.161  CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment in the 
federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio, relying 
on the court’s diversity subject matter jurisdiction.162  Patterson 
filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of 
personal jurisdiction.163  The district court granted Patterson’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.164 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
Patterson’s contacts with Ohio were sufficient to support the 
district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.165  The Sixth 
Circuit referred to the Internet as representing “perhaps the 
latest and greatest manifestation of . . . historical globe-shrinking 
trends.”166  The court assumed the enforceability of the clickwrap 
agreement, noting that Patterson “entered into a written 
contract with CompuServe which provided for the application of 
Ohio law,” and stated that he “then purposefully perpetuated 
the relationship with CompuServe via repeated communications 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1260–61. 
160 Id. at 1261. 
161 Id. 
162 Id.  CompuServe sought a declaration that it had not infringed any common 
law trademarks of Patterson’s, or of Patterson’s company, FlashPoint Development, 
and that it was not otherwise guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practice.  Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1262–68. 
166 Id. at 1262. 
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with its system in Ohio.”167  The court emphasized that Patterson 
was “far more than a purchaser of services; he was a third-party 
provider of software who used CompuServe, which is located in 
Columbus, to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere.”168  The 
court stated that while “merely entering into a contract with 
CompuServe would not, without more, establish that Patterson 
had minimum contacts with Ohio,” that act in conjunction with 
Patterson’s placement of his software product into the stream of 
commerce and other factors established sufficient contact to 
establish jurisdiction.169  Patterson manifested actual assent to 
the SRA first at his computer in Texas, which was then 
transmitted to CompuServe in Ohio.170 
In Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., the Superior Court of 
New Jersey upheld a forum selection clause in a clickwrap 
agreement.171  Caspi involved a class action complaint against 
Microsoft172 arising out of Microsoft’s alleged practice of 
“unilateral negative option billing.”173  The named plaintiffs were 
residents of different states and purported to represent a 
nationwide class of 1.5 million Microsoft Network (“MSN”) 
members.  Microsoft moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction and improper venue by reason of a forum selection 
clause, which was in every MSN membership agreement and 
thus purported to bind all the named plaintiffs and members of 
the class.174  The forum selection / choice of law clause provided 
that the governing law was that of the State of Washington, and 
that each member consented “to the exclusive jurisdiction and 
venue of courts in King County, Washington in all disputes 
 
167 Id. at 1264. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1265. 
170 Id. at 1261. 
171 Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999). 
172 The defendants were two related corporate entities, Microsoft Network, 
L.L.C. and Microsoft Corporation, but this Article will refer to them both simply as 
“Microsoft,” as did the court in the actual case.  See id. 
173 Under this practice, Microsoft without notice or permission from MSN 
members, unilaterally increased membership fees attributing the change to changes 
in the service plans.  Id. 
174 Id. 
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arising out of or relating to your use of MSN or your MSN 
membership.”175 
Finally, in Davidson and Associates v. Jung, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a clickwrap agreement 
that prohibited reverse engineering.176  In that case, the appellee, 
Blizzard, created and sold software games, and provided a 
gaming service available exclusively to purchasers of its games.177  
Because it was concerned about piracy, Blizzard restricted access 
to its service and required agreement to a clickwrap agreement 
that prohibited reverse engineering.  By reverse engineering, the 
appellants were able to create an online gaming system as an 
alternative to Blizzard’s system.  The appellants’ system 
contained operational differences from Blizzard’s system and 
enabled users to play pirated versions of appellee’s games.178  
The court stated that the appellants had expressly relinquished 
their right to reverse engineer by agreeing to the terms of the 
license agreement.179 
3.  Browsewrap Agreements 
Browsewrap agreements are terms that are posted on a web 
site which do not require users to affirmatively manifest their 
consent.  In most cases, the web site or the browsewrap includes 
a statement that the user’s continued use of the web site or the 
downloaded software manifests assent to those terms.  Often, 
the terms of browsewraps are prominently displayed but the 
existence of the browsewrap itself is hidden on a page that few 
users bother to visit–the “Legal” or “Terms” pages.180  Unless 
the user is expressly looking for such information, she or he is 
unlikely to find it. 
 
175 Id. 
176 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2005). 
177 Id. at 633. 
178 Id. at 636. 
179 Id. at 639. 
180 See General Electric, Terms, http://www.ge.com/terms.html (last visited Mar. 
18, 2008); JSTOR, Terms and Conditions of Use of the JSTOR Archive, 
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008); Starwood Hotels, 
Terms and Conditions for Use of This Site, http://www.starwoodhotels.com/ 
corporate/terms_conditions.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 2007] Clicking and Cringing 847 
Generally, courts will enforce browsewrap agreements only if 
the user had adequate notice of their terms.181  In other words, 
the terms must be both conspicuous and accessible.  In Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., for example, the Second 
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration clause in a browsewrap 
agreement because users were able to download the free 
software without indicating assent or acknowledging the license 
agreement.182  Furthermore, in order to view the license terms, 
the users were required to scroll down past the software 
download button and then access the agreement by clicking on a 
hyperlink.183 
Notice was also at issue in Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., where 
the court refused to enforce the terms of an online license 
agreement because the link to it was hard to read.184  Notably, 
that court did not rule that the license agreement was 
unenforceable, only that the web site did not give users adequate 
notice of it.185  In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the Second 
Circuit found that Verio’s continued use of Register.com’s 
WHOIS database constituted consent to Register.com’s terms of 
use, expressly rejecting Verio’s argument that the terms were not 
enforceable because the user had not clicked an “I agree” 
icon.186 
Finally, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 
Ticketmaster claimed that Tickets.com’s use of automated 
search software violated Ticketmaster’s terms of use.187  
Tickets.com used information obtained through its search 
software to provide “deep links” from its web site to 
Ticketmaster’s event listings, thus enabling Tickets.com users to 
bypass Ticketmaster’s homepage.  A prominent notice on 
Ticketmaster’s web site stated that by proceeding beyond the 
home page, the user had accepted the terms of use.  The court 
 
181 Mark Lemley has argued that enforcement of browsewraps should be limited 
to sophisticated commercial entities who are repeat players.  See generally Lemley, 
Terms of Use, supra note 7. 
182 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
183 Id. at 23. 
184 Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
185 Id. at 981–82. 
186 Register.com, Inc.v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2004). 
187 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). 
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agreed, ruling that a contract could be formed simply by 
proceeding to Ticketmaster’s interior web pages “after 
knowledge (or, in some cases, presumptive knowledge) of the 
conditions accepted when doing so.”188 
B.  Balancing Individual Autonomy with Business Interests 
Although courts analyze licenses as contracts, traditional 
contract doctrine often fails to explain the wide range of judicial 
decisions.  In fact, courts often struggle against the constraints of 
contract law, and the requirements of notice and assent, in order 
to enforce the terms of shrinkwrap or browsewrap agreements 
that pass the test of reasonableness but fail on the issue of 
formation. 
Clickwrap agreements, although often lumped together with 
browsewrap and shrinkwrap agreements, are less troubling from 
a doctrinal perspective in that they require a manifestation of 
consent (albeit blanket consent) by the user.  In reality, however, 
this distinction is one without a difference.189  While the 
licensee’s click manifests assent to the transaction and to the 
contractual relationship, often the user does not read–and 
therefore, cannot actually assent to–the contractual terms 
themselves.190  The cases governing nonnegotiated software 
 
188 But in a previous decision on the case, the court ruled that merely posting 
terms and conditions on a web site does not create a contract unless the user had 
actual knowledge of the contract terms.  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Ticket.com, Inc., No. 
CV99-7654-HLH(BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), 
aff’d mem., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13598 (9th Cir. 2001). 
189 In fact, Mark Lemley has suggested that judicial decisions enforcing clickwrap 
and shrinkwrap agreements may have conditioned courts to disregard the concept 
of assent when it comes to browsewraps.  See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 7, at 
469. 
190 The Second Circuit in Register.com, recognized the difference between notice 
as a prerequisite to performance and the dubious need for expressions of assent 
when it stated: 
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht, where 
we declined to enforce Netscape’s specified terms against a user of its 
software because of inadequate evidence that the user had seen the terms 
when downloading the software, and those of Ticketmaster, where the taker 
of information from Ticketmaster’s site knew full well the terms on which 
the information was offered but was not offered an icon marked “I agree,” 
on which to click.  Under the circumstances of Ticketmaster, we see no 
reason why the enforceability of the offeror’s terms should depend on 
whether the taker states (or clicks) “I agree.” 
 2007] Clicking and Cringing 849 
licenses frame the issue as one of contract formation.  But in 
order to understand the wide range of judicial opinions, it is 
necessary to move beyond a discussion of contract doctrine and 
examine the business environment in which these licenses were 
created.  As the court in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology noted in discussing shrinkwrap licenses: 
 When these form licenses were first developed for software, 
it was, in large part, to avoid the federal copyright law first sale 
doctrine. . . . Because of the ease of copying software, software 
producers were justifiably concerned that companies would 
spring up that would purchase copies of various programs and 
then lease those to consumers.  Typically, the companies, like a 
videotape rental store, would purchase a number of copies of 
each program, and then make them available for over-night 
rental to consumers.  Consumers, instead of purchasing their 
own copy of the program would simply rent a copy of the 
program, and duplicate it.  This copying by the individual 
consumers would presumably infringe the copyright, but 
usually it would be far too expensive for the copyright holder 
to identify and sue each individual copier.  Thus, software 
producers wanted to sue the companies that were renting the 
copies of the program to individual consumers, rather than the 
individual consumers.
191
 
As many commentators have argued, these types of agreements 
(and form agreements in other industries) provide a societal 
benefit by facilitating transactions.  In other words, they should 
be enforced not because they manifest the classic signs of 
bargaining, but because they are good for society, and are 
generally not harmful to the licensee.  As Easterbrook noted in 
ProCD: 
Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find 
an insert saying “you owe us an extra $10,000” and the seller 
files suit to collect.  Any buyer finding such a demand can 
prevent formation of the contract by returning the package, as 
can any consumer who concludes that the terms of the license 
make the software worth less than the purchase price.  Nothing 
 
 We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the 
offeree to click on an “I agree” icon.  And no doubt, in many 
circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essential to 
the formation of a contract.  But not in all circumstances. 
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added). 
191 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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in the UCC requires a seller to maximize the buyer’s net 
gains.
192
 
But is Easterbrook actually saying that consent should be 
foisted upon an unwitting consumer who is then forced to 
disavow such consent?  Is it fair to place an affirmative 
obligation upon the buyer to “decline” this unreasonable 
contract term? 
A more palatable explanation of the rationale underlying 
ProCD and other cases upholding contracts “formed” without 
notice is that there is little harm in enforcing the contractual 
term.  While actual assent may be missing, the consumer’s assent 
can be presumed because the consumer would have agreed to the 
term if he or she had actually read it or else the licensor would 
not have permitted the transaction at all.  In nearly all the cases 
upholding the terms of a nonnegotiated software license, the 
licensor was suing because the licensee was using the software or 
product in a manner expressly prohibited by the licensor, not 
because the licensor wished to enforce an affirmative obligation 
term (such as payment of additional money).193  The courts, 
while using the language of contract law, were enforcing fair 
business practices.194 
The courts must use the language of contracts because the 
contract is the vehicle by which the license is made, but it is the 
transfer of (some) rights that affects the analysis of the contract.  
If, for example, the shrinkwrap license is not enforceable as a 
contract due to lack of assent, then the licensor has lost control 
over how the software is used.  If the licensee then decides to use 
the data stored in the software to undermine the licensor’s 
business, the licensor is helpless to prevent such action.  
 
192 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). 
193 See Jacques de Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of 
Contract and Copyright Policies:  In Search of a New Global Policy for On-Line 
Information Licensing Transactions, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 239, 263 n.130 (2003) 
(noting that “commercial use is basically not fair use”). 
194 See id. at 263.  (“The court observed that the defendant in ProCD cannot be 
considered as the best example of an oppressed private user on whom the content 
owner would have imposed unduly restrictive contractual conditions, appearing 
instead as a free-riding competitor.  Viewed from a transatlantic perspective, 
Zeidenberg’s activities would typically have been prohibited by general unfair 
competition laws or laws specifically protecting database producers so that the 
thorny issues regarding both the validity of the contract and the preemption analysis 
could have been totally avoided.”).  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Although the licensor does not have an obligation to provide the 
data in the first place, if the licensor does, the licensee may use it 
in a manner that hurts the licensor’s business unless the licensor 
can protect itself with the only means available–a contract.  
Without a legal right to stop the licensee from using the software 
to the licensor’s detriment, there is then no economic incentive 
for the licensor to develop and distribute the data in the first 
place.195  The intangible nature of the product (that is, not the 
disc itself but the information contained therein), makes the 
need for contract enforcement more compelling.196 
If I decide to sell my car to you, I no longer have the right to 
tell you what to do with it.  If I lease my car to you, however, it 
remains mine, and I should therefore have the ability to set 
parameters on your use.  If I own a store, your presence is 
permitted unless I decide to kick you out.  If you purchase an 
item of clothing from my store, your ability to return it is subject 
to my policy on exchanges and refunds.  If, however, you use my 
web site and accompanying services to solicit my unwitting 
customers to your competing web site, thereby undermining my 
business, I cannot stop you unless I have a contractual right to 
do so.  Unlike in the real world, I cannot kick you out of my 
store or repossess the car.  The only method of enforcement 
available to me is afforded by contract. 
Generally, the court decisions in this area recognize the 
technology provider’s dilemma and, in the interests of 
facilitating business transactions,197 have enforced these 
agreements–at least where there has been notice.198  Often, 
 
195 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 953 (2005); O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 496–99 (discussing why licensors may 
feel the need to include particular provisions that track the Copyright Act). 
196 See Madison, supra note 72, at 290 (discussing how the “former implicit and 
limited governance defined by control of access to chattel and licensing of copyright 
evaporates” with digital technology and how the software license tries to “replicate” 
it). 
197 For a discussion of form agreements generally, see Kessler, supra note 11; 
Rakoff, supra note 12. 
198 In ProCD, for example, the court addressed the realities of the way business is 
conducted in the software industry: 
 Next consider the software industry itself.  Only a minority of sales take 
place over the counter, where there are boxes to peruse.  A customer may 
place an order by phone in response to a line item in a catalog or a review 
in a magazine.  Much software is ordered over the Internet by purchasers 
who have never seen a box.  Increasingly software arrives by wire.  There is 
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notice has been interpreted as an “opportunity to read,” even 
where such opportunity was, in practicality, fictitious.  The 
decisions reveal that the absence of an opportunity to read prior 
to the transaction does not necessarily render an agreement 
invalid.199  A particular provision, however, should not be 
 
no box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of information that 
includes data, an application program, instructions, many limitations 
(“MegaPixel 3.14159 cannot be used with Byte-Pusher 2.718”), and the 
terms of sale.  The user purchases a serial number, which activates the 
software’s features.  On Zeidenberg’s arguments, these unboxed sales are 
unfettered by terms–so the seller has made a broad warranty and must 
pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance, two 
“promises” that if taken seriously would drive prices through the ceiling or 
return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age. 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451–52 (7th Cir. 1996). 
199 The court in ProCD, for example, noted that in certain industries, transactions 
in which the exchange of money precedes detailed terms is common and requiring 
consumers to actually sign contractual terms would result in higher prices and 
greater inconvenience: 
 Consider the purchase of insurance.  The buyer goes to an agent, who 
explains the essentials (amount of coverage, number of years) and remits 
the premium to the home office, which sends back a policy.  On the district 
judge’s understanding, the terms of the policy are irrelevant because the 
insured paid before receiving them.  Yet the device of payment, often with 
a “binder” (so that the insurance takes effect immediately even though the 
home office reserves the right to withdraw coverage later), in advance of 
the policy, serves buyers’ interests by accelerating effectiveness and 
reducing transactions costs.  Or consider the purchase of an airline ticket.  
The traveler calls the carrier or an agent, is quoted a price, reserves a seat, 
pays, and gets a ticket, in that order.  The ticket contains elaborate terms, 
which the traveler can reject by canceling the reservation.  To use the ticket 
is to accept the terms, even terms that in retrospect are       
disadvantageous. . . . Just so with a ticket to a concert.  The back of the 
ticket states that the patron promises not to record the concert; to attend is 
to agree.  A theater that detects a violation will confiscate the tape and 
escort the violator to the exit.  One could arrange things so that every 
concertgoer signs this promise before forking over the money, but that 
cumbersome way of doing things not only would lengthen queues and raise 
prices but also would scotch the sale of tickets by phone or electronic data 
service. 
 Consumer goods work the same way.  Someone who wants to buy a 
radio set visits a store, pays, and walks out with a box.  Inside the box is a 
leaflet containing some terms, the most important of which usually is the 
warranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home.  By Zeidenberg’s 
lights, the warranty in the box is irrelevant; every consumer gets the 
standard warranty implied by the UCC in the event the contract is silent; 
yet so far as we are aware no state disregards warranties furnished with 
consumer products.  Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside 
and an elaborate package insert on the inside.  The package insert 
describes drug interactions, contraindications, and other vital 
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enforced until the licensee has received actual notice of the 
provision.  In other words, the licensee’s obligation to perform in 
accordance with the terms of use arises when the licensee 
becomes aware of such terms, not when the transaction is 
entered into. 
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,200 the defendant Verio sold 
a variety of web site design, development, and operation services 
which competed with the plaintiff Register.com’s web site 
development business.  Verio obtained daily updates of 
information from Register.com’s computers relating to newly 
registered domain names via an automated software program.  
Verio’s practice of e-mail solicitations to those registered names 
was inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive legend 
Register.com attached to its responses to queries by Verio’s.  
Some of the recipients of Verio’s solicitations believed they were 
coming from Register.com (or an affiliate), and were sent in 
violation of the registrant’s election not to receive solicitations 
from Register.com.201  When Register.com sent Verio a cease 
and desist letter, it refused.  Verio claimed that it “never became 
contractually bound to the conditions imposed by Register’s 
restrictive legend because, in the case of each query Verio made, 
the legend did not appear until after Verio had submitted the 
query and received the WHOIS data.”202  Verio contended that 
it did not receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions 
Register intended to impose, and therefore should not be 
deemed to have taken WHOIS data from Register’s systems 
 
information–but, if Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the 
package insert, because it is not part of the contract. 
Id. at 1451.  The court in Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd. cited to the ProCD court’s 
rationale, concluding: 
 While the court agrees with Gigmania that the user is not immediately 
confronted with the notice of the license agreement, this does not dispose 
of Pollstar’s breach of contract claim.  Taking into consideration the 
examples provided by the Seventh Circuit–showing that people 
sometimes enter into a contract by using a service without first seeing the 
terms–the browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and 
enforceable. 
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000); see also Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
200 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
201 Id. at 396–97. 
202 Id. at 401. 
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subject to Register’s conditions.203  The court rejected Verio’s 
argument: 
 Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries 
addressed to Register’s computers had been sporadic and 
infrequent.  If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if 
it had submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give 
considerable force to its contention that it obtained the 
WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended 
to impose conditions, and without being deemed to have 
accepted Register’s conditions.  But Verio was daily submitting 
numerous queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice 
of the terms Register exacted.  Furthermore, Verio admits that 
it knew perfectly well what terms Register demanded. Verio’s 
argument fails.
204
 
In other words, even if Verio was not aware of Register.com’s 
terms of use at the time it entered into the transaction, it 
subsequently became aware of the terms.  While Verio did not 
have an opportunity to read the terms prior to each transaction, 
because it engaged in multiple transactions, it had actual notice 
of such terms at the time Register.com issued its cease and desist 
demand.  If, however, Register.com had sued Verio for breach of 
contract after the first transaction (and assuming that it had not 
sent Verio a cease and desist letter), the results would be 
otherwise.  As the court noted: 
 The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P 
maintains a roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples.  A 
visitor, defendant D, takes an apple and bites into it.  As D 
turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to exit, 
which says “Apples–50 cents apiece.”  D does not pay for the 
apple.  D believes he has no obligation to pay because he had 
no notice when he bit into the apple that 50 cents was expected 
in return.  D’s view is that he never agreed to pay for the apple.  
Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D revisits the stand, 
takes an apple, and eats it.  D never leaves money. 
 P sues D in contract for the price of the apples taken.  D 
defends on the ground that on no occasion did he see P’s price 
notice until after he had bitten into the apples.  D may well 
prevail as to the first apple taken.  D had no reason to 
understand upon taking it that P was demanding the payment.  
In our view, however, D cannot continue on a daily basis to 
take apples for free, knowing full well that P is offering them 
only in exchange for 50 cents in compensation, merely because 
 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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the sign demanding payment is so placed that on each occasion 
D does not see it until he has bitten into the apple.
205
 
Verio’s claim of “lack of notice” was disingenuous, not because 
it had such notice at the time the transaction was entered into, 
but because it subsequently had notice and chose not to comply 
with such terms. 
Similarly, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, the defendant was being 
sued for using the ProCD data in a manner that the defendant 
knew was contrary to the licensor’s business model given the 
pricing differential of the commercial and noncommercial 
versions of the product.  As the owner of the software code, the 
licensor has the right to establish the way in which it may be 
used.  Zeidenberg had no independent right to use that software, 
and was only permitted to do so pursuant to a license granted by 
ProCD.  The issue of whether Zeidenberg actually assented to 
the scope of license terms was irrelevant; what was relevant was 
that he knew what they were when he engaged in the prohibited 
behavior.  While Zeidenberg was not obligated to act in 
accordance with such terms until he became aware of them, once 
he became aware of the terms of use he was bound by them.  
The same is not true if the provisions impose an affirmative 
obligation or deprive the licensee of a legal right.  ProCD, as 
licensor, could not force Zeidenberg to perform affirmative acts 
(such as start a business promoting ProCD’s products) via a 
shrinkwrap license; it could, however, determine the scope of the 
license granted to Zeidenberg.  Zeidenberg, in purchasing the 
software, was buying only a limited right to use the software 
without being sued by the actual owner–ProCD–and that 
permission was granted contingent upon the terms of use 
contained in the license.  The grant of that permission, however, 
could not diminish Zeidenberg’s preexisting legal rights. 
Returning to the car leasing analogy, if I let you lease my car, 
I can set the parameters of your use.  If you do not abide by my 
wishes, I can take away your right to use my car.  If you are not 
aware of my conditions–for example, that I do not want you to 
smoke in my car–you can smoke until I find out about it and 
tell you to stop.  You cannot continue to smoke in my car 
knowing that I don’t want you to because it is, after all, my car.  
Nor can I make you pay for cleaning the car to rid it of the odor 
 
205 Id. 
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of smoke unless you knew beforehand that smoking was 
prohibited. 
C.  Sample License Analysis 
This Article argues that those terms that are part of a 
nonnegotiated license agreement include those to which the 
licensee has actually assented, and those pertaining to the scope 
of license or terms of use if they do not impose affirmative 
obligations or deprive the licensee of legal rights.  What happens 
then where a nonnegotiated license agreement contains 
affirmative obligation terms unrelated to the scope of the license 
or terms that deprive the licensee of a legal right? 
In this section, I apply my proposed approach to a sample 
shrinkwrap license agreement containing many of the provisions 
found to be standard in such agreements.206 
 
 
SAMPLE LICENSE AGREEMENT 
By opening this package and installing the product, you are 
consenting to be bound by this License.  If you do not agree to 
all of the terms of this License, return the product to the place of 
purchase for a full refund within thirty (30) days. 
 
This provision imposes an affirmative obligation upon the 
licensee and would not be enforceable because there is no actual 
assent. 
 
LICENSE 
Company ABCXYZ (“the Licensor”) retains all title, 
copyright, and other intellectual property rights in VRS-Home 
(“the Software”) and hereby grants you (“the Licensee”) a 
nonexclusive License to use the Software enclosed.  Licensor 
retains all rights not expressly granted herein. 
 
206 For a discussion of terms commonly found in shrinkwrap agreements, see 
Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1242–48 (examining the purpose 
underlying proprietary rights, limitation on warranties, and limitation on user rights 
provisions). 
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This sentence clarifies the nature of the transaction as being a 
license, and not a sale or transfer of intellectual property rights to 
the software code.  Because it does not impose affirmative 
obligations upon the licensee or deprive the licensee of legal 
rights, it should be enforceable. 
 
Licensee shall not disclose, provide, or otherwise make 
available any trade secrets, copyrighted or patented material, in 
any form to any third party.  All terms of this License are in 
effect to the fullest extent permissible under applicable law. 
 
It is unclear what “make available” means.  If it means that the 
licensee is prohibited from permitting third parties to infringe 
upon the trade secret, copyright, or patent rights of the licensor, it 
merely informs the licensee of its existing legal obligations.  If it 
means that the licensee cannot permit third parties to use the 
software, that restriction is covered in the section on Scope of 
License.  If the intent of this provision is to impose an obligation 
on the licensee to hide the software from third parties, it is not 
enforceable.  The prohibition against disclosure of trade secrets 
seems particularly nonsensical.  The typical consumer licensee is 
not privy to confidential information and the software is being 
sold to the public at large.207  Because this sentence imposes a 
blanket obligation of nondisclosure upon the licensee, it should 
not be enforceable. 
 
SCOPE OF LICENSE 
This is a License and not a sale.  Licensee may use the 
Software on a single computer under Licensee’s personal 
control, but may not run the Software on any computer, system, 
or network which permits use by more than one person at a 
 
207 See Hemnes, supra note 61, at 577–81 (explaining that lawyers for software 
developers used to think that the only protection for their client’s programs was 
under trade secret law, but in order to do so, the right of possession had to be 
separate from the right of alienation); Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 
1281–82 (noting that shrinkwrap licenses permit software vendors “to obtain both 
patent and trade secret protection concurrently in different aspects of the same 
program, as well as copyright protection in the whole program” with the result 
being that “vendors can obtain the powerful rights of patent law without having to 
‘pay the price’ of a shorter term and the loss of trade secret protection”). 
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time.  Licensee may make one copy of the Software for back-up 
purposes only. 
Licensee may transfer the Software to another user who 
accepts the terms of this License, provided that Licensee assigns 
all rights and obligations under this License to such other person 
and erases all copies of the Software under Licensee’s control.  
Licensee may not use, sell, rent, or deal with Software in any way 
other than as expressly provided herein. 
Licensee may not modify, adapt, alter, change, reverse 
engineer, or transform the Software, except to the extent 
permitted by law. 
 
This provision provides the terms of use or the conditions 
under which the licensor licenses its software.  The licensee should 
not have the right to use the software in a manner prohibited by 
the licensor.  Furthermore, the licensee does not have the legal 
right to use the software at all without the licensor’s permission, 
which the licensor is granting only with these restrictions.  
Generally, prohibitions against modifying and reverse engineering 
deprive the licensee of a right expressly granted under the 
Copyright Act; however this particular reference expressly permits 
such activities “to the extent permitted by law.”  Consequently, this 
provision would be enforceable.208 
 
TERM 
This License shall remain in effect only for so long as Licensee 
is in compliance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.  
License terminates automatically if Licensee fails to comply with 
any of its terms and conditions.  Licensee agrees, upon 
termination, to destroy all copies of the Software. 
 
 
208 In Davidson and Associates v. Jung, the appellants were able to create an 
alternative online gaming system by reverse engineering.  While the court in that 
case upheld the prohibition against reverse engineering contained in the contract, 
under the approach proposed in this Article, such a prohibition would require 
actual assent.  The appellants in Davidson and Associates, however, would still be 
prohibited from the infringing activity under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 
which prohibits a person from circumventing a technological measure that controls 
copyright-protected works.  Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639–42 (8th 
Cir. 2005); see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Davidson and Associates). 
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This provision sets forth terms of use, and termination of the 
right to use, the software.  As it does not impose an affirmative 
obligation or deprive the licensee of a legal right, it should be 
enforceable. 
 
The intellectual property rights, limited warranty, and 
limitation of liability provisions set out in this License shall 
continue in force after termination.  
 
This provision requires actual assent. 
 
WARRANTIES 
THE LICENSOR HEREBY DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL 
WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE SOFTWARE, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF FITNESS 
FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES OR 
MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, 
SATISFACTORY QUALITY, INTEGRATION, OR 
LIABILITY ARISING FROM ANY COURSE OF 
DEALING, USAGE OF TRADE, OR TRADE PRACTICE.  
LICENSEE AGREES THAT THE SOFTWARE IS BEING 
PROVIDED “AS IS” AND THAT LICENSOR HAS MADE 
NO EXPRESS WARRANTIES REGARDING THE 
SOFTWARE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO 
FUNCTIONALITY AND OPERATION OF THE 
SOFTWARE LIES WITH THE LICENSEE, AND 
LICENSOR ASSUMES NO RISK OR OBLIGATION IN 
CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
LIMITED LIABILITY 
IN NO EVENT SHALL LICENSOR BE LIABLE FOR 
ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING, 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS, 
LOSS OF USE, AND INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, REGARDLESS OF FORM OF 
ACTION, WHETHER CONTRACT OR TORT 
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE).  THIS EXCLUSION 
COVERS ANY LIABILITY THAT MAY ARISE OUT OF 
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FORESEEABLE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS AGAINST 
LICENSEE. 
IN NO EVENT SHALL LICENSOR’S LIABILITY 
EXCEED THE PRICE PAID BY LICENSEE. 
 
Under the U.C.C., the licensee has the right to certain implied 
warranties;209 however, the U.C.C. recognizes and permits 
warranty disclaimers provided that they are conspicuous, mention 
merchantability, and are in writing.210  The enforceability of this 
disclaimer would depend upon how the relevant state implements 
and interprets the U.C.C. provisions governing warranties and 
warranty disclaimers.  The U.C.C. does not expressly require the 
consumer’s assent to warranty disclaimers, although the 
requirements of conspicuousness indicate that the drafters viewed 
such disclaimers as being contractual in nature.  In addition, the 
provisions must comply with the federal law governing written 
warranties, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  If these 
provisions do comply, then they should be enforceable.211  
 
209 Section 2-314 states that “[a] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is 
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of 
that kind.”  Section 2-312(3) states that “a seller that is a merchant regularly dealing 
in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful 
claim of any third person by way of infringement.” 
210 Under section 2-316(2): 
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part 
of it in a consumer contract the language must be in a record, be 
conspicuous, and state “the seller undertakes no responsibility for the 
quality of goods except as otherwise provided in this contract,” and in any 
other contract the language must mention merchantability and in case of a 
record must be conspicuous . . . . [T]o exclude or modify the implied 
warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be in a record amd be conspicuous. 
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2003). 
211 The issue of whether the provisions comply with the U.C.C. requirements may 
nevertheless pose some difficulties.  For example, in Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., the 
Delaware Superior Court found that a warranty disclaimer in a rolling contract was 
conspicuous even though it was located within the product packaging.  Rinaldi v. 
Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *19 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (mem.).  For a critique of that case, see Friedman, supra 
note 11, at 692 (“The Rinaldi court’s reasoning on conspicuousness was far from 
unassailable and demonstrates some of the weaknesses of using conspicuousness to 
assess the timing of disclaimers.”)  The Rinaldi court relied too literally on ProCD, 
thus illustrating the danger of claiming actual assent where there is in fact none.  If 
the court in ProCD had expressly stated that it was presuming assent to the scope of 
license terms–and no other–the Rinaldi court would have had no precedent for 
claiming that there was actual assent to all packaged terms.  Implied warranty 
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Limitations of liability are also permitted under the U.C.C. 
provided that they do not fail of their “essential purpose.”212  
Again, their enforceability depends on how a particular 
jurisdiction has interpreted the U.C.C. provision governing 
limitations of liability. 
 
INDEMNITY 
Licensee agrees to indemnify Licensor for any third-party 
claims arising out of misuse, infringing use, or other illegal use of 
Software. 
 
This provision uses language that appears to impose an 
affirmative obligation upon the licensee.213  Ordinarily, the 
licensee would be liable for any infringement caused by her 
misuse; however, she would not be obligated to indemnify the 
licensor against all claims filed against the licensor.  Because the 
provision imposes an affirmative obligation upon the licensee, it 
would not be part of the agreement between the parties without 
actual assent.  As a practical matter, a third party suing the 
licensor on the basis of misuse by licensee would have to prove the 
licensor’s involvement, whether by passive knowledge or active 
assistance. 
 
GOVERNING LAW 
This License shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the substantive laws in force in the State of 
 
disclaimers are clearly not conspicuous if they are contained within the package and 
unavailable for inspection until after purchase. 
212 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2003).  Section 2-719(1)(a) provides: 
[T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution 
for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of 
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer’s remedies 
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and 
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts . . . . 
213 The provision is poorly drafted; although the language can be interpreted as 
“any misuse” by any person, the more reasonable interpretation of this provision 
would require the misuse to have been conducted by the licensee.  To the extent 
that the licensor is purporting to make the licensee responsible for misuse by third 
parties, it imposes an affirmative obligation that is not expressly agreed to and there 
is unlikely to be a default state law that imposes such an obligation absent 
extenuating circumstances. 
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California.  Licensee agrees that all claims shall be subject to 
binding arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”).  This License constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties with respect to use of the 
Software and supersedes any previous agreements. 
 
This provision restricts the licensee’s ability to bring a lawsuit.  
This provision is enforceable if the licensee actually assented to it.  
If it did not, then assent cannot be presumed.  The court would 
then refer to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which permits 
informal dispute resolution procedures provided they conform to 
certain requirements.214 
 
CONCLUSION 
Licensors may fear that the manipulability of software makes 
it susceptible to infringers who may be difficult to locate and 
control.215  I do not wish to resolve in this Article whether a 
licensor’s fears of infringement are legitimate; my Article 
assumes that they are.216  Regardless of whether this fear is well 
founded,217 owners of intellectual property should be permitted 
 
214 Magnoson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1–703.5 (2008). 
215 See Madison, supra note 72, at 313–14 (“In a world of mass-marketed software 
. . . developers needed a mechanism to protect both copyright interests and their 
confidential information while simultaneously sharing these products with the world 
at large.”).  Those who claim that a producer of software is adequately protected by 
patent law ignore that many software producers do not file patents.  John R. 
Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2007). 
216 As Mark Lemley explains, while today it is generally accepted that copyright 
law protects computer software, the issue remained unresolved through the late 
1970s until the enactment of the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act.  The same 
uncertainty reigned over the patentability of computer software.  See Lemley, 
Intellectual Property, supra note 5, at 1242–43; see also O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 
488–90 (noting the ways in which the soft copy world differs from the hard copy 
world which may compel licensing of software).  Providers of electronic databases, 
however, may not be protected under copyright law and may need the protection 
offered by a license.  See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th  Cir. 
1996); see also Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of Copyright Protection for 
Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg:  Are Shrinkwrap Licenses a 
Viable Alternative for Database Protection?,  31 IND. L. REV. 143 (1998). 
217 See Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. 
L. REV. 433, 446–52 (2003), for a discussion of evolution of the clickwrap agreement 
as a mechanism for protecting the commercial value of computer programs and 
databases. 
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to establish the parameters of any license grant.  The freedom to 
do so, however, is subject to the preexisting rights of the 
licensee.  The courts have used the language of contract law to 
uphold nonnegotiated software licenses even where actual assent 
was absent.  This Article argues that rather than upholding such 
agreements by claiming that the licensee actually assented to the 
terms, the courts should expressly acknowledge the use of 
presumed assent.  Presumed assent should only be applied to the 
scope of the license terms or the terms of use.  A finding of 
presumed or actual assent is necessary to contract formation; 
however, a contract might still be found unenforceable if 
traditional contract defenses, such as unconscionability, are 
applicable.  Furthermore, the obligation to perform in 
accordance with the terms of use or the scope of license should 
be subject to notice.  Thus, the condition to the effectiveness of 
those provisions where there is only presumed, not actual, assent 
should depend upon an opportunity to read the terms. 
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